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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three independent chapters which address separate questions in 
relation to labor economics and economics of education 
Wage Penalty of Vocational Education: Evidence from the UK (Chapter 3) 
In this chapter, I examine the difference in wages between academic and vocational 
education in the UK based on Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) from 2001 to 2013. First I 
examine the crude wage differences between vocational and academic education. To 
further test the differences between two types of education, I examine the effect of the 
education expansion on the returns to higher levels of vocational qualification, based on the 
difference-in-difference (DID) methodology. The results suggest that the reform has 
negative effects on the wage of holders of higher levels of vocational education. The 
penalties vary considerably, depending on the type of vocational qualification. 
Does age-dependent minimum wage affect employment? evidence from UK (Chapter 4) 
The chapter studies the age-dependent minimum wage in the UK, which is used to regulate 
the flow of young workers into the labor market. In this chapter, I examine the employment 
effect of becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate by applying Regression 
Discontinuity (RD). The results suggest that an increase in the minimum wage has a positive 
effect on employment probability for higher skilled worker covered by the minimum wage 
but not for lower skilled workers, and it may also lead to crowding out effect coming from 
higher skilled workers. Moreover, higher skilled workers tend to transfer from a temporary 
job into a formal job more easily after becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate and 
this pattern is the opposite for lower skilled workers. The evidence suggests that the labor 
market in which the minimum wage prevails is very competitive during the recession and 
lower skilled workers may bear the cost of competition due to the discontinuity caused by 
age-related increases in minimum wage. 
[5] 
Quantitative effects of higher education expansion on the returns to education: Evidence 
from the UK (Chapter 5) 
This chapter studies the effect of the education expansion on the returns to education 
based on Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and Understanding Society. After examining 
the heterogeneous returns, I apply the difference-in-difference (DID) methodology to 
examine the effect of the education reform on the returns and the matching Difference-in-
Difference (MDID) methodology to account for the compositional change across cohorts 
since those newly recruited university graduates after the reform might be different from 
the previous graduate cohorts. Newly recruited university graduates consist of “fresh 
students” who entered universities as school leavers typically with A-level and workers with 
several years of work experience called “mature students”. The MDID results show that the 
expansion of higher education mostly reduces the returns for fresh students and it mostly 
appears in the post-expansion period. The mature students have more stable returns 
compared with fresh students. 
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Chapter 1  
General introduction 
The economics of education is to study how the education has proceeded and the 
impacts of the education on social and economic outcomes. Education provides 
pivotal skills and helps individual get into employment. It is strongly correlated 
with employment, earnings, life satisfaction, and so on.  
The discussion of the human capital is the core of the economics of education, 
especially after Gary Becker who is normally considered as the founder of the 
modern economics of education. After both extensive and intensive development 
of the human capital theory, we know that the human capital can increase a 
person’s productivity directly and signal a person’s potential productivity. 
Moreover, it is multi-dimensional and can also increase the adaptability in a 
changing environment. The human capital is distinctive by the types of education, 
innate abilities, quality of education, and other types of training. The pre-labour 
market factors have an influence on the individual’s educational attainment, such 
as parental background, financial budget constraint, neighbourhood, and so on. 
Moreover, the regulations and the ideology of the education system are different 
across the world. It also deeply affects the individual’s choices of education. The 
interventions are designed to achieve the potential productivity of a person and 
to meet the employer’s needs of the skills.  
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In this thesis, I address three separate questions in relation to the outcomes of 
education.  
 
The return to vocational education (Chapter 3) 
In the UK, students will choose to continue their education or finding a job after 
the compulsory education at 16. Compared to the compulsory schooling, there 
are many types of qualifications from 16-19, broadly categorized as vocational or 
academic. Vocational education was rapidly developing in the UK. It is considered 
as an efficient pathway for people to acquire more skills. Finding the subtle 
differences between academic and vocational education is important regarding 
the political interest.  
In this chapter, I examine the wage differences between academic and vocational 
education in the UK based on Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from 2001 
to 2013. First, I estimate the crude wage differences between vocational and 
academic education over time. To further test the differences between two types 
of education, I estimate the effect of the “Education Reform Act 1988” on the 
return to higher levels of vocational qualification, based on the 
difference-in-difference (DID) methodology. The results suggest that the reform 
has negative effects on the higher levels of vocational education. The negative 
effects vary considerably, depending on the type of vocational qualification. 
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Does age-dependent minimum wage affect employment? Evidence from the UK 
(Chapter 4) 
The average years of education increased significantly in these three decades in 
the UK. There are still a considerable amount of individuals who only have GCSEs 
in the labour market. They may be young or have relative few working 
experiences, making them the most vulnerable employees in the labour market. 
This chapter studies the age-dependent minimum wage in the UK, which is used 
to regulate the flow of young workers into the labour market. I examine the 
employment effect of becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate by 
applying Regression Discontinuity (RD). There is a strong evidence of 
heterogeneous effects by qualifications. The results suggest that there is no 
significant effect of the increased minimum wage on the employment probability 
for individuals below GCSE and the significant discontinuity mainly comes from 
higher skilled workers. Individuals with higher numbers or grades of GCSE have 
a higher probability of being employed after increasing the minimum wage. 
There are no significant effects for individuals with lower numbers or grades of 
GCSE. The number of GCSEs held by employed individuals and proportion of 5+ 
GCSEs among employed workers increase across the threshold, suggesting that 
there is a crowding out effect. Moreover, the results strongly suggest that 
higher-skilled workers tend to find a more full-time permanent or full-time job 
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after becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate. But on the other hand, 
lower skilled workers have a lower probability of finding a full-time permanent 
job. The evidence of higher employment probability and higher satisfying job 
accession probability may imply that there is a crowding out effect coming from 
higher skilled workers. Although the result is modestly significant, the higher 
number of GCSEs and the higher proportion of 5+ GCSE suggest the existence of 
crowding out effect directly.  
 
Quantitative effects of the higher education expansion on the returns: Evidence 
from the UK (Chapter 5) 
The university graduates increased significantly after the Education Reform Act 
1988. It provided more opportunities for students pursuing a degree. It also 
opened doors for people who have working experiences or fewer years of 
fundamental education compared to the students who finish A-level. In the UK, 
there are a considerable amount of students who start a job prior to obtaining 
the highest qualification, known as “returning students”. Few pieces of evidence 
have been found regarding the return to returning students. In this chapter, I 
apply the relatively new methodologies to re-examine the effect of the education 
reform on the returns to academic education and highlight the returns of those 
returning students.  
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After examining the heterogeneous returns, I apply the difference-in-difference 
(DID) methodology to examine the effect of the education reform on returns and 
the matching Difference-in-Difference (MDID) methodology to account for the 
ability bias since those newly recruited university graduates after the reform 
might be different from the previous graduates. Newly recruited graduates 
consist of “fresh students” who graduate from A-level or other schools and 
workers with several years of working experiences known as the “returning 
students”. I notice that there is a compositional change among graduates. It is 
expected that the degree of relaxation of requirements changed over time. The 
proportion of the returning students among those university graduates increased 
significantly after 1976. The compositional change may bring uncertain 
heterogeneities into the results.  
From the DID results, both fresh students and returning students don’t have a 
significantly negative effect in the pre-expansion period in which there are 
increasing the supply of university graduates who don’t have working 
experiences before. The MDID results correct the innate ability bias and estimate 
the quantitative effect on returns for returning students, leading to a negative 
effect to the returning students. Interestingly, during the post-expansion period, 
the DID results show that fresh students have been more affected by the 
increasing supply of returning students. After correcting the ability bias, both 
results become more negative.  
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The thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter introduces the education 
system in the England and methodologies in this thesis. The third chapter is the 
first empirical chapter which examines the differences between academic and 
vocational education. The fourth chapter is the second chapter which examines 
the effects of increasing minimum wage on employment. The fifth chapter 
examines the effect of education expansion on the returns to education. The last 
chapter is the conclusion which describes the main findings of this thesis and the 
future research plan. 
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Chapter 2 
The UK education system and review of the methodologies 
 
2.1 Review of Further Education in England. 
In England, children enter primary school at the beginning of the school year 
when they turn into five years old. The schools normally start from September. 
That means the primary schools will receive the students following their fourth 
birthday.1 The leaving age of compulsory education is now 18 since summer 
2015, arising from 17 in 2013 and 16 before 2013. The education choices are 
flexible between 16 and 18. Students may select from full-time education, 
work-based learning, or part-time education and part-time employed. In the 
following, I will focus on the education system which is effective till 2013 and 
covers the whole sample periods from 2008 to 2012 inclusive.  
The outputs at each Key Stage are set out in the National Curriculum and the 
National Tests would be taken at the end of each stage, age 7 (Key Stage 1), age 
11 (Key Stage 2), age 14 (Key Stage 3), age 16 (Key Stage 4). Students are 
expected to meet certain levels accordingly at the end of each stage’s learning, 
primary school (Entry Level), lower secondary school (Level 2), upper secondary 
                                                        
1  See 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/family/education/school-education/access-to-educ
ation/ 
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school (Level 3). The secondary education usually takes place between 11-18. 
Until 2013, at the end of compulsory schooling (secondary schooling), all 
students are expected to take at least five General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE) (Hupkau et al, 2016).2 In 1988, the O-level and CSE exams are 
combined into General Certificates of Secondary Education (GCSEs).3 It gives 
students wider options regarding the subjects and also encourages more 
students who swing between O-level and other qualification into education. The 
students will receive scores from A-G, where A is the highest score in GCSEs.4 
After the transition from GCSEs to O-level, the A-C scores in the GCSEs will give 
students more influence in the labour market. GCSE belongs to the National 
Qualification Framework (NQF) and a GCSE with grades A-C belongs to Level 2 
and a GCSE with grades D-G belongs to Level 1. The vocational GCSEs are 
introduced since 2000.  
After Secondary schooling, some students who are normally between 16 and 19 
continue to take further education. In England, Further Education (FE) refers to 
                                                        
2 See Hupkau et al (2016) which describe the UK education system in a figure for the 
most intuitive understanding that how different levels of education are organized.  
3 The Act enacted in 1988, introduced major changes into the education system in 
England. First, the National Curriculum and the standard attainment test (SATS) for 
children 7, 11, 14 were introduced. Second, in order to provide better quality of 
education, the government adopted the concept of “quasi-market”. The schools were 
encouraged to compete with each other and recruit students without fewer limits in 
order to increase the efficiency in the market. The schools had to find ways for the 
“consumers”, namely the parents of students, to easily access the information to make a 
correct move. The results of this policy make some schools larger and others face the 
possibility of shutting down. 
4 A* was granted in 1994 to the top student in GCSEs. 
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the education after the compulsory education of 16.5 It is a crucial part of the 
education system and has been developing over-time. There is no unified 
classification of Further Education. Broadly it could be grouped into three 
categories (Cuddy and Leney, 2005). The first category includes general tertiary 
colleges. Those institutions provide professional training in a wide range of 
subjects. The second category comprises sixth-form colleges that typically 
provide education for the 16 to 18 years old. Those schools specialize in 
providing full-time courses for both academic and vocational education. The 
third category includes private trainer providers. There are vast numbers of 
private education providers. Each specializes in a field. Compared to academic 
education, vocational education serves a versatile role in the labour market. 
Vocational education can provide more specific skills to help the unemployed 
workers after a job-loss or to enhance their skills in the existing workplace or 
obtain more education in order to pursue a higher education. Accordingly, there 
are wide ranges of institutions to serve people with different purposes. There are 
1168 publicly funded Further Education institutions in the UK in 2014, including 
247 tertiary colleges, 94 Sixth Form colleges, and 827 private training providers 
respectively (Hupkau and Ventura, 2017). They also conclude that the population 
of students at Further Education institutions has decreased by one million over 
the two years after 2005 due to the decrease in the value of the certificate in the 
                                                        
5 Here I only summarize the education system in England since it contains most 
students and Education systems in Wales and North Ireland are rather similar to 
England. 
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labour market. The funding that supported the Further Education institutions 
previously is transferred to support the learners to pursue Full Level 
qualifications.67  
 
2.1.1 Academic track. 
After compulsory education, students may continue to stay in an academic track 
education, a vocational track education or a mixture of the two. Large numbers of 
the student who remain in the academic-track education will choose 
Advanced-Levels between 16 to 18 years old. They will be rewarded the GCE 
Advanced Subsidiary (AS) qualification after 1 year and the A2 Level after two 
years at Key Stage 5, Level 3. Normally they will take three or more subjects over 
2 years and those are the standard requirements for university entrance. Most of 
the A-Level graduates will continue their education in universities. The new 
A-Level system allows them to take half of the exams in the first year. In the 
second year, they will be awarded the full GCE A-Level after completing the 
                                                        
6 The General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs) were introduced in 1992. It is 
designed to be more classroom-based taught vocational qualifications. Compared to 
National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) that are more work-related, GNVQs are more 
flexible. Due to the structure of GNVQs, students may continue higher levels vocational 
education or go to workplace instead. The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) was 
introduced in 2000 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. All Vocational Education 
and Training (VET) were regulated under this framework and made comparable to other 
qualifications. The NQF specifies nine levels (entry level and levels 1 to 8). Each level 
consists of different qualifications, including both academic and vocational qualifications. 
It is ended in 2007. 
7 The Department of Education has recently created a set of non-A-Level categories at 
Level 3, known as “Applied Generals and Tech Levels” and a set of non-GCSE categories 
at Level 2, known as “Tech Certificates” (Hupkau et al, 2016). 
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exams successfully. The subjects in A-Level have great influence on choosing the 
subjects in the university. For example, math and science subjects are essential in 
many universities for a science related degree. 
The major changes for higher education system started from 1988 to 1994, 
followed by the “Further and Higher Education Act 1992”, which converted some 
higher education institutions and polytechnics into universities. This changed 
pushed more students to become university graduates directly. Moreover, it also 
relaxed the requirements for students because of the large reduction of the 
funding from the government. Both changes resulted in the large increase in the 
university graduates. 
 
2.1.2. Vocational track. 
For those students who are unwilling to stay on academic education, some of 
them will stay on the vocational education. The vocational education system in 
the UK is developing over time. Back in the 1960s, after the Industrial Training 
Act 1964, the vocational education normally consisted of one day a week of study 
at a further education college, along with an apprenticeship, mostly provided by 
City and Guild of London Institute (CGLI). This system didn’t work well in 
practice and it quickly collapsed during the 1970s to 1980s (Machin and Vignoles, 
2005). Similar to CGLI, Business Education Council (BEC) and Technician 
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Education Council (TEC) also provided the day-release courses in the 1970s. 
The Business and Technology Education Council (BTECs) was found in 1983 after 
merged by the BEC and TEC.8 The BTECs are regulated by the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority (QCA) in the same way as NVQs. The aim of the BTECs is to 
provide courses in business and technology for the 16-19 years old. It was 
designed to benefit the student by providing both general and vocational 
education. It offers courses to meet the need of industries in a range of subjects, 
including Ordinary Certificate/ Diploma (ONCs/ONDs) and Higher Certificate/ 
Diploma (HNCs/ONDs).  
The National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) was set up by the 
government in 1986 (now known as the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority) 
and the role of NCVQ is to accredit the National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs). 
The NVQs aim to increase the skills for those in work. There are leading bodies 
that are responsible for organizing the connection between employers and 
education providers. The NVQs consists of eight levels. The highest level could 
compare to the postgraduate degree. There are many units of competency tests 
for each NVQ and the tests will cover the knowledge applied to specific job 
functions. The assessments of the NVQs normally carry two aspects. One includes 
the performance of the practical works. The other includes the traditional skill 
tests and questioning. There are three main NVQs providers: the further 
                                                        
8 See West and Steedman (2003) for more details. 
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education sector colleges, private training organizations and some companies. 
One of the keys for providing NVQ is to set up a network with companies. This 
leads to one of the major merits of the NVQs that it provides work-related 
content in a simulated work environment and it aims to provide both the 
core-skills and the work-related skills. Some barriers have been proposed when 
organizing the NVQs, such as small companies unwilling to provide positions, the 
cost of organizing assessment and training supervisors. More importantly, there 
is a lack of the connection of the needs of the skills between students and 
employers’ need. And the assessment is more arbitrary compared to normal 
education.9  
 
2.1.3 Modern Apprenticeship. 
The modern apprenticeship was introduced in 1993 by the Conservative 
Government. It was designed to fill the skill gap between the employees and the 
employers by providing more flexible and work-related knowledge, mainly for 
16-24 years-old workers with intermediate skills. In principle, it is open to 
workers regardless their age. The apprentices who are above 25 years old are 
regarded as the older-apprenticeship. The fields of the modern apprenticeship 
not only cover the traditional craft and manufacturing, but also the service 
sectors. Another major change was the financial support of the government and 
                                                        
9 See the Further Education Funding Council (1994) for more details. 
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the way of organization of the funding to the apprenticeship.10 The cost of the 
training now is transferred to the government via the Skills Funding Agency.11 
Compared to the previous youth training schemes which deliver the skills mainly 
at Level 1 and 2, the modern apprenticeship covers wider workers including 
Level 3 and Level 4 (Fuller, 2016). The modern apprenticeship in England, 
supported by the government starts from Level 2 (broadly equivalent to GCSEs at 
grades A* to C), known as Intermediate Apprenticeship. The higher 
apprenticeship includes Level 3, known as Advanced Apprenticeship and Level 4, 
known as Higher Apprenticeship.12 Compared to the old apprenticeship, the new 
modern apprenticeship includes more industries and frames its structure into 
NQF (Fuller and Unwin, 2003). Due to the nature of the structure of 
apprenticeship, it is quite flexible across different apprenticeships, in terms of 
pay, length, off-the-job training, etc. In order to strengthen the training and 
creditability of the apprenticeship, Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) 
developed the Technical Certificates which includes the details of knowledge 
training, assessment and teaching program (Fuller and Unwin, 2003). Concerns 
have been raised recently in relation to the effectiveness of apprenticeship, the 
probability of accrediting the skills rather than providing the skills to workers.  
 
                                                        
10 In 2014, each apprentice received 1500 pounds supported by the government and the 
organizations didn’t need to pay the national insurance fees for the apprentices in 2016 
(Fuller, 2016).  
11 The Skills Funding Agency will be responsible for registering the training providers 
rather than the employers.  
12 The Level 4 apprenticeship was introduced in 2009-2010. 
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2.1.4 Education finance. 
After completing compulsory education at 16, many students will continue their 
study either in an academic track or in a vocational track. Students from lower 
social-economic groups are less likely to participate in the post-16 education. 
One of the barriers is the financial constraint. To encourage the less advantaged 
students to continue their study, the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE) introduced the Education Maintenance Allowances (EMA) in 2004.13 It 
covers all students in the United Kingdom. The 16-19 Bursary Fund was 
introduced to replace the EMA in England in 2011. Both the EMA and 16-19 
Bursary Fund are designed to provide financial support14 for students who stay 
in full-time education between 16-18 years old. The magnitude of the support is 
dependent on the annual income of the family.  
In England, there had been no tuition fees for university students since 1962. 
However, as a part of the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998, tuition fees 
were reintroduced at 1000 pounds per year in 1998. Together with the 
introduction of the tuition fees, the maintenance grants were also abolished 
(Dearden et al, 2011).15 At the meantime, the government replaced the grants 
with tuition loans and maintenance loans in order to offset the negative impact 
                                                        
13 Before the formal EMA was introduced in 2004, there is a pilot provision from 1999 
to 2003 in 15 Local Education Authorities (Dearden et al, 2001).  
14  The funds are expected to spend on clothing, food, transport, book, and the 
equipment in the class, see https://www.gov.uk/1619-bursary-fund 
15 They also pointed out that the real value of grants had been largely eroding in the 
1990s.  
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on students. Many factors are contributive to the introduction of the tuition fees. 
One of the most important reasons could be the increasing numbers of university 
students and the decreasing average funds per person, especially due to the 
education expansion after 1988. Moreover, the flexible tuition fees may also 
increase the competition among universities on the basis of the 
marketization-oriented concept. 
Later on, the tuition fees have been raised up to 3000 pounds in 2004 for the new 
students after 2006-2007, arising out of the Higher Education Act 2004 (Dearden 
et al, 2012). During those periods, the proportion of university students from the 
low social-economic groups was stagnant compared to the fact that the total 
numbers of university graduates increased significantly. In order to encourage 
more students with disadvantaged family background into universities, the 
maintenance grants were reintroduced at the same time at 1040 pounds per year 
and the students can obtain up to 2700 pounds at most (Dearden et al, 2011). 
Another major change as a result of the Act was that all fee loans could be repaid 
after graduation. All of the fees, grants, and loans are dependent on the basis of 
the parental income. In 2012, it has been largely raised again up to 9000 pounds 
per year.16  
 
2.2 Methodologies Reviews. 
                                                        
16 See House of Commons (2016). 
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One of the main features that differ micro-econometrics from statistics lies in the 
distinction in the ideology between “relation” and ”causal relation”. The empirical 
studies of labour economics focus on estimating the “treatment effect” or the 
“causal relation”. People are interested in the counterfactual outcomes before 
they take the move.17 It involves the “what if” question, leading to the popularity 
of the concept, known as “potential outcome” which are the imaginary outcomes 
when the individual takes both choices. It requires an unrealistic parallel world. 
That’s why the applied economists focus on eliminating the selection bias, caused 
by the differences in characteristics between treatment takers and non-takers. It 
can easily be tackled by the social experiment. However, since social experiments 
are rarely existing, empirical studies rely on constructing the “counterfactual 
group” in most of the time, called the “natural experiment method”.18  
 
2.2.1 Instrument Strategy and Control Function method. 
The regression is the cornerstone of applied econometrics nowadays as well as 
the increasing popularity of the reduced form. The Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) 
is a standard method to examine a simple relationship between the variable of 
interest and the outcome on the basis of observable covariates. The basic idea is 
                                                        
17 The so-called “frequentist inference” assumes that the estimates remain unchanged 
across individuals. The Bayesian inference assumes that the estimates follow the 
random process under a probability distribution. 
18 Blundell et al (2009) use “natural experiment method” to denote a methodology that 
constructs a comparison group in a properly designed experiment.  
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to adjust the observable covariates between the treatment and the control group 
to make them identical, like a random social experiment. It is a method that 
belongs to “selection on observables”.  
Under the framework of potential outcomes, the causal effect is identified on the 
basis of two parallel groups. A regression on observables can rarely meet the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), in which it assumes that the 
variable of interest is independent of the potential outcome. In another word, the 
variable of interest is randomly assigned given the control variables. If the CIA 
fails, the independents are correlated with the residuals, known as “endogeneity”. 
There are three main sources of endogeneity, Omitted Variable Bias (OVB), 
Reverse Causality and Measurement Error. The bias caused by omitting variables 
for which need to control is called the “Omitted Variable Bias (OVB)”. For most 
empirical labour studies, the variables are insufficient to capture all potential 
channels (lower R-squared) and some channels are closely related to the variable 
of interest such that it is needed to control for (collinearity). Due to the data 
generating process of the repeated cross-section data, the problem of 
endogeneity and limited information can’t be avoided. Moreover, we don’t even 
know the extent to which the OVB and endogeneity exist in the research.  
In order to bypass the endogenous problem in the regression, Instrument 
Variable (IV) strategy is widely used by the applied economists. The choice of 
instruments is the pivotal issue in an IV strategy. Contrary to adding more 
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variables into the regression, the IV approach tackles this problem in an opposite 
direction in which it claims the exogeneity of the instruments and the variation 
of the variable of interest brought by the instruments is used to identify the 
causal effect between the outcome and the variable of interest. The regression of 
the endogenous variable on the instruments is the “First Stage” and then the 
regression of the instruments and other exogenous variables on the outcome is 
called the “Reduced From”.19 The estimate of an IV strategy is the ratio of the 
reduced form to the first stage. A good instrument needs to meet two restrictions. 
First, the instrument needs to have a strong and clear relationship with the 
endogenous variable or the variable of interest. Second, the instruments can only 
affect the outcome in the way through the first stage. It suggests that the 
instruments are only correlated with the variable of interest rather than other 
determinants of the dependent variable or the error terms, known as the 
“exclusion restriction”. 20  The exclusion restriction doesn’t guarantee the 
functioning of IV strategy. The instruments may have insufficient variation to 
capture the change in the outcome in the first stage, leading to the “weak 
instruments”. This will happen if there is no selection on the idiosyncratic gain. In 
addition, a good instrument that meets the exclusion restriction rule is hard to 
                                                        
19 The exogenous covariates should be included in both first stage and reduced form. 
The failure of inclusion of the covariates would incur the biased result due to the fact 
that the covariates are not independent with the residuals in the first stage. If the 
covariates are sufficiently independent from the instruments, including the covariates 
would produce more precise results. See Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
20 The treatment effect might be heterogeneous. A heterogeneous effect may help us 
clarify the distinction between internal validity and external validity (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009). 
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find in practice.  
Very similar to IV strategy, the endogenous variable in the reduced form can be 
replaced by the estimated value in the first stage. The parameter of the estimated 
variable is called the estimator of the Two-Stage-Least-Squared (TSLS). 
Compared to the normal IV strategy, TSLS can include more instruments in the 
first stage when the instruments capture the same causal effect. When 
implementing the TSLS, it is essential to keep the same covariates in both first 
stage and reduced form (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
The causal effect of a treatment is identified when comparing the same treatment 
group and control group. This derives the terms such as 
“Always-takers”, ”Compliers”, ”Never-takers”, and ”Defiers” under the context of 
Angrist and Pischke (2009).21 In practical studies, a researcher needs to be 
careful to clarify that the causal effect on which subgroup is identified.22 
Different instruments estimate different causal parameters and a set of 
instruments may trigger more people caused by a single instrument. On the basis 
of the conceptual framework of potential outcomes, researchers are interested in 
estimating the average treatment effect (ATE). The ATE only exists in a perfectly 
randomized experiment, in which the treatment is randomly assigned across 
                                                        
21  Always-takers are defined as those who receive the instrument and take the 
treatment. Never-takers refer to those people who receive the instrument and don’t take 
the treatment. Compliers refer to people who take the treatment whenever they receive 
the instrument. Defiers refer to people who don’t take the treatment due to the 
instrument. 
22 The estimated effect would be different with including different samples. 
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observations. It equals to average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) plus the 
selection bias caused by the differences between the treatment group and the 
control group. In the IV strategy, the ATT is estimated on the basis of the random 
assignment as an instrument for the treatment received. Due to the fact that the 
treatments normally follow a self-selection process even when the treatments 
are randomly distributed since individuals will choose if they will pick up the 
lotteries.23 If the compliance rate is not perfect, then it drives another concept, 
known as the “Intention-to-treat” effect (ITT). It occurs when individuals select 
the treatment given their own needs. That also differentiates between those who 
have the lotteries and turn it down and those who have the lotteries and pick it 
up. In other words, we should be careful when we draw the conclusions which 
target to which groups of people. 
Moreover, similar to TSLS, a control function method has been proposed based 
on the instruments. The bias comes from the situation where the independents 
are correlated with the residuals. Compared to TSLS, the control function method 
includes the residuals that are estimated by regressing the endogenous variable 
on the instruments. The endogenous variable would become independent after 
including residuals, served as a control variable in the reduced form. It can also 
allow for the heterogeneous effect by including interaction terms between the 
residuals and endogenous variable, called “Correlated Random Coefficient (CRC)”. 
                                                        
23 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1] + 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1] −
𝐸[𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0] 
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In practice, the control function method produces similar results to the TSLS.24  
In general, OVB can be regarded as selection bias from the perspective that the 
sample selection bias could be solved by adding more variables into the 
regression. Selection bias mostly refers to self-selection of individuals to the 
samples in practical scenarios. The difference is that OVB can be transferred into 
sample selection bias. Perhaps the most famous method to tackle the selection 
bias is the Heckman Model (Heckman, 1979). It is widely known that the 
selection bias would be a big threat to the results. There is considerable 
literature focusing on “selection on un-observables” in the recent decades. I 
explain in more detail in the sensitivity test part. 
One of the major limitations of the normal IV strategy is the assumption that the 
treatment effects are identical across treated observations. In a more general 
case, one should notice that the treatment effects are heterogeneous. Imbens and 
Angrist (1994) proposed the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) to identify 
the impact of treatment around the neighbour’s characteristics when the impact 
of the instrument is highly heterogeneous. The LATE captures the difference in 
means for those individuals who switch to take the treatment, triggered by the 
instruments.25 The LATE relies on four assumptions, independence, exclusion 
restriction, monotonicity and first stage. With these four assumptions, LATE will 
capture the effect of the treatment on the subpopulation that changes the 
                                                        
24 See Wooldridge (2014), page 421. 
25 𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸 =  𝐸(𝑌|𝑍=𝑧1) – 𝐸(𝑦|𝑍=𝑧2) 
𝑃𝑟(𝐷=1|𝑍=𝑧1) – 𝑃𝑟(𝐷=1|𝑍=𝑧2)
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treatment status due to the seemingly unrelated instrument, known as 
“Compliers”. In practice, LATE is usually performed on the basis of TSLS. It 
estimates the weighted average of the causal effect on subgroups that are 
triggered by the instruments in the context of heterogeneity. TSLS estimates the 
weighted average of the causal effect of a subpopulation, identified by the 
instruments.26  
Rather than identifying the compliers, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) propose the 
Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) to estimate the heterogeneous treatment 
effect.27 Compared to the LATE that estimates the average treatment effect 
around a point in the distribution of unobserved factors (compliers), the MTE 
estimates the treatment effect on the basis of individuals’ “net willingness-to-pay” 
or the distribution of unobserved factors.28 
 
2.2.2 Matching. 
Matching belongs to the non-parametric estimation. The goal of matching is to 
                                                        
26 See Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
27 ∆𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥, 𝑢𝑑) = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0 |𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝑑 = 𝑢𝑑 ), where 𝑢𝑑 is the mean net utility given 
covariates that can be estimated as propensity scores. This framework suggests that the 
MTE is a willingness-to-pay measure that the estimate is the marginal gain under the 
covariates on the basis of the 𝑢𝑑. If the MTE does not depend on 𝑢𝑑, then IV equals to 
MTE. 
28 Triggered by the instrument the unobserved factors of the compliers lie in around a 
point in the distribution of unobserved factors. The unobserved distribution is estimated 
given the framework of propensity scores.  
 
27 
construct a control group that is to a large extent close to the treatment group on 
the basis of a set of observables. It makes covariate specific comparison between 
treated and non-treated observations and sums the weighted cells together to get 
the average treatment effect. It is a method that belongs to the data 
preprocessing rather than a statistical method.  
Several assumptions are needed when applying the matching strategy. One 
identification assumption is known as “Unconfoundedness”, selection on 
observables, or CIA. The “Unconfoundedness” implies that the potential outcome 
is independent of treatment variable given a set of observable covariates. 
Another is called “Overlap” or common support. It guarantees that observations 
with certain covariates can be found in both treatment and control groups. In 
reality, the common support could be a problem if the proportion of uncovered 
individuals is high to some extent. The results would be biased if the dropped 
observations are not randomly assigned too. The sensitivity tests would be 
needed in order to check the robustness of the results. With the spirit of 
matching strategy, several matching algorithms have been proposed, such as the 
Nearest Neighbor Matching, Caliper and Radius Matching, Kernel Matching, etc. 
There are also some restrictions for the matching strategy. First of all, the major 
weakness is the selection on observables. That means that researchers are 
required to have all the relevant information in order to satisfy the CIA. Second, 
matching is rather data-hunger and the numbers of observations are not enough 
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in a survey dataset sometimes. Third, the results exist arbitrary when choosing 
the balance between the quantity of information and the proportion of common 
support (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009).  
As an empirical strategy, the results would be volatile given the different process 
of implementing the strategy. Before performing the matching strategy, one 
should access the overlap and trim the original data on the basis of t statistics or 
normalized differences. The traditional rule is to drop those treated observations 
for which there are no on-support observations in the control group (Robin and 
Rosenbaum, 1983). Huber et al (2013) propose a procedure of dropping 
observations in which those non-treated observations with a higher importance 
and treated observations with propensity scores above a threshold. Given their 
procedures, Lechner and Strittmatter (2017) suggest that the threshold could be 
at the maximum or the 99% quantile of the propensity score in the non-treated 
subpopulation. Second, one should also check the “selection on observables”, 
although it is not testable directly. Imbens (2015) argues that the calculation in 
order to check the “Unconfoundedness” focus on estimating the effect of the 
treatment on a pseudo outcome, a variable which is unaffected by the treatment 
or the effect of the treatment on the lagged outcome. Lastly, after accessing the 
plausibility of the assumption of the matching strategy, one can estimate the 
causal effect of the treatment on outcomes.29  
                                                        
29 Imbens (2015) argues that one can use replacement and bias-adjustment to reduce 
the bias. 
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2.2.2.1. Propensity Score Matching (PSM). 
One of the limitations of a matching strategy is the large dimensionality, causing 
“curse of dimensionality”. The curse of dimensionality is a phrase used in many 
subfields related to statistics. Here it refers to a situation that it is unlikely to find 
matched observations between treated group and control group in a matching 
strategy. Rosenbaum and Robin (1983) proposed to use a balancing score to 
perform a matching strategy. The scores have been estimated based on given 
observables, called “Propensity Scores”. It becomes very popular because of its 
simplicity. The Propensity Scores are pivotal to the results. Compared to the full 
covariates matching strategy, the PSM only includes the information before the 
treatment in order to remove the unbalance. This will lead to higher asymptotic 
standard errors.30 It converts the attention of the researchers from estimating 
the outcomes to treatment assignment, playing a flexible role together with other 
estimating strategies. Most empirical papers use a parametric model together 
with a matching. Although it is simple, the results could be rather volatile given 
the estimated propensity scores. Several alternatives have been proposed by 
applying non-parametric models or the relatively new machine learning technics. 
The next step is to perform matching by using the propensity scores rather than 
covariates after deciding the neighbours for each matched observation in the 
                                                        
30 Angrist and Hahn (2004) argue that even though the asymptotic standard error can 
not be improved by PSM, there could be a gain in the precision in finite samples.  
 
30 
treatment group. In order to adjust the differences given the propensity scores, 
one can weight the treatment group and the control group to construct more 
balanced groups, or one can divide the sample into subsamples, called “blocking”, 
or one can do the regression on the propensity scores directly. The way of 
matching and the selection of the bandwidth is normally an empirical question.  
 
2.2.2.2. Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). 
The weights are the pivotal issue in a weighting strategy. Since the reweighting 
and matching type of strategy is more or less like a black box, we should be very 
careful when choosing the weights. The covariate matching and PSM still have 
the weakness. Making some covariates balanced is easy, but sometimes it also 
makes others even more unbalanced (Iacus et al, 2012). It is hard to choose the 
balance between covariates and matching quality, known as “equal percent bias 
reducing” (EPBR). CEM is a recently proposed method to help derive the weights 
and check the results from the PSM. 
Basically, the CEM 31  is to coarsen each variable in order to group those 
substantively indistinguishable observations and then weights are estimated on 
the basis of the coarsened data given existing algorithms as well as the pruning 
of unmatched observations. The set of strata generated by the first step of the 
CEM is used to eliminate substantive differences across variables on the basis of 
                                                        
31 The CEM belongs to the MIB (Monotonic Imbalance Bounding).  
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the chosen level defined by the coarsening. From my own perspective, the CEM is 
ideal for matching the variables which include dummies or discrete variables in 
an ambiguous way, such as including measurement error.   
According to the explanation of Iacus’s paper, CEM requires no assumption in 
relation to the data generating process and the imbalance after matching will not 
be larger than without matching, which is a unique feature compared to other 
matching strategies.  
 
2.2.2.3. Matching vs. Regression. 
Both regression and matching are based on constructing the counter-factual 
untreated group to estimate the treatment effect. They are the methods of 
selection on observables, all relying on the CIA. So there are no major differences 
between matching and regression from an empirical perspective. 32  The 
difference between matching and regression is the weights to sum the 
covariate-specific effects into a single value. A regression uses a variance 
weighted average treatment effect while a matching uses the probability of 
taking a treatment as weights. In other words, a regression should be same as a 
matching if the treatment is independent of covariates (Angrist and Pischke, 
                                                        
32 Compared to regression, matching may lose information after those unmatched cases 
are discarded even when there are “good” reasons to drop those unmatched 
observations.  
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2009).33 
Both regression and matching involve a certain amount of extrapolation. When 
implementing a matching strategy, a researcher needs to select bandwidth to 
determine the common support.34 A regression that is not saturated and fails to 
meet the requirement of common support may affect the results by extrapolation. 
Compared to a matching strategy, there is also no absolute rule of dropping “no 
common support” or ”thin common support”35 in a regression, because the 
parametric regression will extrapolate the counterfactual outcome for the 
treated observations on the basis of the covariates. Although there is a fact that 
the empirical research is heavily based on the regressions, the common support 
has been neglected to some extent. But without the common support, the 
extrapolation over un-observables requires the absence of endogenous variables. 
On the other hand, matching doesn’t need the exogeneity assumption compared 
to parametric regressions, given that the variables used for matching are 
determined before the treatment (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009).  
 
2.2.2.4. Weighting with Regression. 
                                                        
33  Matching puts the most weights on the cells which there are most treated 
observations. Regression puts the most weights on the cells which the treated 
observations are the same as the control observations. 
34 Picking the bandwidth would be arbitrary since if the bandwidth is too small, then 
there are few observations in each cell, leading to dropping of the cells and the loss of 
information. On the other hand, if the bandwidth is too large, then there are more risks 
that treated group and control group are not identical.  
35 “No common support” refers to the situation that there is no observation in the 
control group that is similar to the observations in the treatment group.  
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In the standard econometric textbook, weighting can be used to tackle with the 
heterogeneity problem in a regression. But it is not very popular in 
micro-econometrics since the problem would not be serious when heterogeneity 
is mild (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). There are several uses for matching in a 
regression. In principle, weighting can be used to make your sample more close 
to the target population. One important use of weighting is to balance the sample 
when the sample is unrepresentative, for which it can be achieved by weighing 
with inverse probability weighting. Another interest regarding weighting is its 
practical use in estimating the causal effect. One popular way to construct a 
comparable treatment group and a control group is to implement the inverse 
probability weighting on the basis of propensity scores.36 Rightful using of the 
reweighting can reduce the bias in a regression, but it may also increase the 
random error and bias the estimates. Implementing reweighting could be both 
empirical and hard.  
 
2.2.3 Difference-in-Difference (DID) and Matching Difference-in-Difference 
(MDID). 
Since it is costly to conduct a social experiment, researchers mostly take 
                                                        
36  𝐴𝑇𝐸 =  𝐸[𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)] = 𝐸 [ 𝑌𝑖∗𝑇
𝑒(𝑋𝑖)
 −  𝑌𝑖−(1−𝑇)
1−𝑒(𝑋𝑖)
] . See Hirano and Imbens (2001); 
Angrist and Rokkanen, 2015.  
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advantage of the existing social and economic reforms to estimate the causal 
relations. After the work by Ashenfelter and Card (1985), the DID has been added 
into the toolkit. A mixed effect between the treatment effect and the common 
trend that is the default effect if there is no treatment is estimated by the 
subtraction between the outcomes of treatment group across the time t. The 
common trend can be estimated by the subtraction of control group. Then the 
causal effect can be estimated by the subtraction of the differences between 
treatment group and control group.  
In a more general setting, the group and the period can be extended into multiple. 
Panel data is often used to apply the DID. One of the advantages of the panel data 
is that one can apply Fixed Effect (FE) model together with DID in order to 
remove the unobserved group or time effects. The main advantage of DID is that 
after the first difference in periods, it rules out the selection on an untreated 
outcome. The time period normally is one dimension, but it may refer to another 
dimension rather than the “time”. 
But the DID also relies on a strict assumption that the common trend would be 
identical to the treatment group. In practice, the common trend assumption can 
be easily violated either due to the fact that a control group will also be affected 
by the treatment or the control group is rather different from treatment group, 
leading to a failure of the common support. 37  The results would vary 
                                                        
37 Abadie (2005) proposed a two-step procedure to deal with the problem that the 
treatment group and control group don’t follow parallel paths. The STATA code calls 
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considerably with the control group selected by the researcher. Second, the 
results would be biased if the treatment has been anticipated. Third, the results 
would be biased due to the serial correlation problem (Bertrand et al, 2004). 
Much of the debate focuses on the validity of the randomness of the treatment 
assignment and its estimation format. Fourth, the results would be biased if the 
un-observables of individual are correlated with the choice of taking treatment. 
It guarantees that there is no compositional change across groups after the 
treatment has been implemented. By combining the merits of both matching and 
DID, the methods MDID may correct the bias from DID.38 In other words, it is 
ideal to tackle the compositional change across either treatment group or control 
group due to the treatment.  
 
2.2.4 Regression Discontinuity (RD). 
The RD is a quasi-experimental design in which the probability of receiving 
treatment will be changed discontinuously across the threshold as a function of 
control variables. There are two types of RD, sharp and fuzzy. The sharp RD is 
when the treatment status has discontinuously changed after the threshold. The 
fuzzy RD is when the probability of taking treatment has discontinuously 
changed after the threshold. The essence of RD is to compare the treatment 
group on the right-hand side of the cut-off point and the comparison group on 
                                                                                                                                                              
“absdid”, written by Kenneth Houngbedji. 
38 See Heckman et al (1997). 
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the left side of the cut-off point. The control group from marginally below the 
threshold is valid counterfactual for treatment group from marginally above 
threshold (Hahn et al, 2001). Around the threshold, the treatment status is 
independent of all variables no matter observable and unobservable like a 
random assignment. So the causal effect is identified by the jump around the 
threshold. The discontinuity of a RD strategy can be regarded as a weighted 
average treatment effect on all individuals in the presence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects (Lee and Lemieux, 2009). Another major merit of RD is the 
graphical analysis. The distinct jump across the threshold is very intuitive for 
audiences. Both the actual and the predicted outcome can be illustrated on the 
basis of running variables. The graph will also give us the implication given the 
unexpected jump over the running variables. But, the selection of the bandwidth 
could affect the regression results and the graphical intuition. There is no unified 
rule to adopt the bandwidth. The cross-validation is suggested (Lee and Lemieux, 
2009).39 
The RD is a powerful design to capture the causal relationship with minimum 
assumptions. However, several assumptions are still needed. One of the key 
assumptions is that the observations are randomly distributed across the 
threshold. The distance of the observation will decrease the randomness. So our 
wish is to select the closest observations around the threshold. However, due to 
                                                        
39 If the bandwidth is too narrow, then the results would be imprecise. If the bandwidth 
is too wide, the results would be less informative to tell the story.  
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the limit of data, we have to balance the numbers of observations and the risks of 
non-randomness. Due to this dilemma, Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) proposed a 
method to re-weight the running function in order to increase the observations 
without increasing the potential bias.40 More recently, Dong (2016) argues that 
the result might be biased due to the kink effect and she proposed a general 
method, called “regression probability jump and kink (RPJK) design”. Another 
key assumption is that the running variables are continuous (Hahn, et al, 2001). 
Moreover, normally RD model is to apply polynomial forms to estimate the 
effects of the running variables are linear.41 This could introduce bias if the 
parametric forms don’t fit the observations. Non-parametric models are 
proposed to mimic the running variables. Imbens and Lemieux (2008) argue that 
the standard kernel estimation is not appropriate for RD since we are interested 
in the effect of a boundary bound.42 They suggest that local linear regression, 
series regression or sieve method would improve the results.  
 
2.2.5 Sensitivity Test. 
Although the applied economists have put many efforts into fitting the results, 
                                                        
40 In their paper, they choose Propensity Score to estimate the running function. The CIA 
(Conditional independence assumption) and common support guarantee the function of 
the RD strategy.  
41 A practical guide for the polynomial terms is to represent every set of the polynomial 
terms to show the sensitivity of the results.  
42  The tradeoff between precision and bias is a fundamental problem of kernel 
regressions.  
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but in most of the work the results can only half explain by the regressions. In 
order to claim the results are robust, we need to rely on some assumptions, such 
as independence between error term and treatment variable. Therefore, various 
robustness and sensitivity tests are used to examine the assumption. Altonji et al 
(2005) propose a method, known as “AET”, in which they examine if the results 
will vary when changing the correlation between the error term in the selection 
function and the error term in the reduced form. In the most recent 
developments, Oster (2016) propose another method in order to relax the two 
strict assumptions of AET, R-squared equals to one and equivalent importance 
between observed factors and unobserved factors.  
 
2.3 The Returns to Education. 
The return to education is one of the central topics in education economics. 
There are several major concerns in the empirical studies of return to education. 
Most empirical papers are based on the “Mincer Equation”. First of all, the 
decision of education is highly endogenous, leading to stubborn selection bias 
into the results. Various studies tackle this problem with richer data, such as 
including the family background or early testing scores (Dearden, Lorraine, 1999; 
Meghir and Palme, 2005; Vignoles et al, 2010; Castex and Dechter, 2014). But 
using the family backgrounds to remove the ability bias has been criticized due to 
the fact that the family backgrounds are endogenous and don’t strictly meet the 
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validity assumption in the IV strategy. 43  Moreover, the results are also 
accompanied by the age effect and the cohort effect, given the fact that the 
returns to education are heterogeneous in terms of age and birth cohort 
(Mcintosh, 2006; Bhuller and Salvanes, 2017).44 Third, the cognitive skills play 
important roles in determining both the decisions and the returns to education. 
Early scores have been used to proxy the personal ability in many studies. Many 
of them have argued that the cognitive skills have a strong positive correlation 
with returns. However, those skills might be multi-dimensional. The traditional 
cognitive skills may play different role compared with mechanical skills. Prada 
and Urzua (2017) argue that the mechanical ability is positively correlated with 
the returns but negatively correlated with the probability of university 
attendance. Fourth, the returns to education could be highly heterogeneous since 
there are many types of education targeting different groups of people. People 
who choose different education tend to have a rather diverse background, 
leading to complicated results. 
Two trends are popular in dealing with the endogeneity when identifying the 
returns to education. The first trend is to use a comprehensive background to 
                                                        
43  Trostel, Walker and Woolley (2002) examine the returns to education across 
countries with and without the control of family backgrounds. They point out that the 
traditional OLS results are underestimated and they also argue that the use of family 
backgrounds as proxies for children’s ability is potentially problematic and an empirical 
question in the end.  
44 Bhuller and Salvanes (2017) examine the life cycle earnings on the basis of three 
identification strategies given a rich panel data in Norway. They find that the internal 
rate of return is around 11% and the standard Mincer equation tends to underestimate 
the return to the additional education. 
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control for the difference before attending to the education. The second trend is 
to use education reform as an instrument to estimate the effect of the additional 
education on returns, such as increasing compulsory schooling (Devereux and 
Hart, 2010), changing education path (Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2010), the 
accessibility of schooling (Angrist and Krueger, 1991). The exogenous changes in 
years of education may help to eliminate the self-selection problem when 
estimating the returns.   
Even though the results are not biased as a result of selection bias, the returns 
still could be highly heterogeneous as a result of the complex nature of returns to 
education. Many econometric tools have been proposed to tackle with regarding 
the heterogeneity among the students. Instrument strategy is a popular tool to 
estimate the returns to education as well. Given the study of Imbens and Angrist 
(1994), the LATE can evaluate the returns of people who change education 
choices as a result of the change in the instruments. However, in the context of 
heterogeneity, the people changed by the instruments might not be the same as 
the people who make the same decisions given the unchanged policy. Put it 
differently, the returns could be highly heterogeneous. Carneiro et al (2011) 
propose to estimate the returns to education by applying MTE given the same 
instruments. The marginal and average returns are not essentially the same, but 
the conventional average returns can be constructed on the basis of the marginal 
returns.   
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Chapter 3  
Wage Return of Vocational Education: Evidence from the UK 
 
3.1 Introduction：motivation, research questions and contributions. 
A large amount of literature focuses on the issue of “Over-education” proposed 
by (Richard B. Freeman, 1976). 38% of university graduates are over-educated in 
their first job in the UK (Dolton and Vignoles 2002). The differences in the 
returns between academic and vocational education have attracted much 
attention from researchers. Compared to academic education, vocational 
education tends to provide firm and industry-specific skills. It not only prepares 
young students with specific skills but also offers a training route to enhance 
skills for academically oriented students.  
In this chapter, I examine the crude differences in returns between vocational 
and academic education over birth cohorts. The results show that vocational 
qualifications have lower earnings compared to academic qualifications at 
similar levels and there are differences between different types of vocational 
education.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to examine the effect of the education 
expansion on the returns to vocational education since a growing literature 
examines the effect of education expansion in the UK after 1988 on academic 
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students (Walker and Zhu, 2008; Devereux and Fan, 2011) and finds no 
significant effects on the returns to university graduates, but little research has 
been done in terms of the impacts on vocational education. The increasing 
university graduates will compete with individuals with higher levels of 
vocational qualification directly, leading to an increasing pressure on vocational 
students. My aim is to test the stability of the returns to vocational qualifications. 
Although the returns to university graduates will also be changed during the 
education expansion, I examine the relative returns to vocational education 
compared to academic education in this chapter, rather than the causal effect of 
increasing university graduates on the returns to vocational students. If 
vocational students have unique advantages in the work-field, their returns will 
not be strongly affected by the increasing supply of university graduates. The 
results suggest that the wage caused by the education reform varies depending 
on the types of vocational qualification. I limit the range of age into 32-43 years 
old as a result of common support. It can allow me to examine the full 
productivity of individuals when they are in the middle of the career (Blundell et 
al, 2000). 
However, unlike academic education, students in vocational education could be 
less homogenous in relation to the educational background, types of knowledge 
and so on (Billett 2011).45 There are a wide range of types of vocational courses 
                                                        
45 Different programs serve different purposes. For instance, the National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQ) qualifications are more work-based and the Business and 
Technology Education Council (BTEC) qualifications are more course-based. Both 
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and providers. The structures of vocational education are more flexible. 
Individuals have more choices in relation to the training they need according to 
their plans. That encourages workers who are already in work to obtain more 
education through a vocational track. In my sample, around 70% of vocational 
students acquire their highest qualification with several years of working 
experiences and they can be classified as “returning students”. Others who obtain 
their highest qualification without working experiences can be defined as “fresh 
graduates”.46  
From econometric perspectives, there are three difficulties in examining the 
difference in returns between the academic and the vocational education. The 
main difficulty lies in dealing with the differences in innate abilities between 
vocational and academic students before participating into the programs. Family 
background and early testing scores are commonly used to control for the innate 
personal ability (Dearden et al, 2002; Gavon, Conlon, 2005). Dearden et al (2002) 
argue that the effect of omitting innate ability would be mixed.47 However, 
personal abilities would be very complex in this case due to the different nature 
                                                                                                                                                              
diversity of the program and limit of data may bring heterogeneity into the analysis. 
46 Vocational education can serve different purposes. Firstly, it may help individuals 
with their specific competence or skills related to the work. Secondly, vocational 
education can continuously help individuals with their skills and competence in the long 
term. Thirdly, vocational education can also help with the transition from one job to 
another, regardless of the transition is voluntary or forced. In the words, vocational 
education can help people with identifying the interest at the beginning, assisting with 
the career development later on and refining the specific competence and skills in the 
whole period of career (Billett 2011). 
47 After controlling family background based on National Child Development Study 
(NCDS), the results are similar to the results in Labour Force Survey.  
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of the two types of education.48 They may have comparative advantages in 
different types of job. 49  Moreover, there are also difficulties in terms of 
examining the returns to education. The return to education often varies with 
age, birth cohort and level of education. McIntosh (2006) argues that the returns 
to vocational education remain constant throughout their working life. It is 
ambiguous to pin down the causal relation in terms of the difference in the 
returns between academic and vocational education on the basis of the early 
scores or the family background due to its strong magnitude of self-selection. A 
more convincing method is to take advantage of a quasi-experiment which 
induces people to switch between vocational and academic tracks.  
The second issue is due to the various types of vocational education, leading to 
rather heterogeneous results. In the UK, there are several different vocational 
paths for students, such as National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs), Business 
and Technology Education Council (BTEC) etc. Moreover, students may change 
the path as a result of the education expansion. The third issue is due to the 
complex background of the vocational students compared to the academic 
students. There is a lack of information regarding their educational background. 
                                                        
48 For instance, advanced cognitive skills may be distinct from communication skills and 
it is uncertain to tell which type of skill is more advanced or difficult to acquire since 
individuals are significantly different. Evidence has shown that the innate abilities have 
multiple dimensions (Prada and Urzua, 2017). 
49 From employer’s perspectives, after taking into account the retraining cost between 
two types of workers, employers’ hiring decisions will reflect the relative advantages 
and the degree of substitutability between the two types of education. Put it in another 
way, there is a tradeoff between higher learning ability with poorly matched knowledge 
and lower learning ability with precisely matched knowledge. 
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A significant proportion of vocational students obtain their highest qualifications 
with working experiences. The previous educational background might also be 
rather heterogeneous. So, I examine the differences in the returns between 
academic and vocational education on the basis of a quasi-experiment in the UK, 
trying to address the self-selection problem.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief 
literature review. Section 3.3 outlines my estimation methodology. Section 3.4 
describes data and variables used in this chapter. Section 3.5 presents the results. 
Section 3.6 presents the conclusions and limitations. 
 
3.2 Literature review. 
The differences in the returns between academic and vocational education have 
been examined in many countries, but so far there are no unified conclusions.  
A common empirical model to examine the difference in the returns is to add a 
dummy to represent the vocational worker in a regression. Hotchkiss (1993) 
examines the return to secondary vocational training on a training-related job 
after high school within two years. He finds that there is a wage premium for the 
vocational students in a training-related job. Neuman and Ziderman (1999) 
replicate his work based on the Israeli census data. They argue that Hotchkiss’s 
work may be biased, since he focuses on young workers at the beginning of their 
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career, leading to biased results. Vocational education may have advantages in 
work-related job, but the job might be at lower skill levels. It turns out that the 
average return is still lower than academic education. In the UK, Dearden et al 
(2002) find that the academic education tends to have higher returns than the 
vocational education based on the 1998 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 
and the 1991 sweep of National Child Development Study (NCDS). They also 
examine the selection bias by comparing the differences between QLFS and NCDS. 
After removing the selecting bias, the NCDS results are similar to the QLFS 
results without controls for the backgrounds.  
On the other hand, considerable evidence suggests that vocational education may 
have a wage premium. Hawley (2003) shows that vocational education has 
higher returns for both men and women at the secondary and post-secondary 
level in Thailand. However, due to the fact that vocational students may have 
different innate abilities, the results might be strongly biased due to the omitted 
variable problem. Family background and personal ability indices are popular 
tools to tackle the selection bias. Moenjak and Worswick (2003) conclude that 
individuals from a well-do family are more likely to choose vocational education. 
After accounting for the family background, they find that the return to a 
vocational education is higher than a general education. Conlon (2005) finds that 
personal ability and family backgrounds have mixed impacts on choosing the 
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types of education.50 Meer (2007) builds a first stage model to remove selection 
problem with student‘s background and school quality. He finds that student 
from academic route may earn more by using the National Education 
Longitudinal Survey (NELS) of 1988.51 Backes-Gellner and Geel (2014) find a 
positive return to a vocational education compared to an academic education.52 
They find that the two types of workers have a similar unemployment risk, but 
there is a higher return to vocational students in early career period. Vocational 
students have a lower risk of unemployment but the higher return disappears in 
the long-term. But different occupations and industries tend to have different 
results. Applying the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) based on a family 
background to eliminate innate ability bias is very popular in the literature. 
However, it doesn’t meet the exclusion restriction since a family background is 
not strictly exogenous in the wage equation. 53  Andersson, Nabavi and 
Wilhelmsson (2014) find that the vocational students tend to have 3-8 percent 
higher return than the students in an academic education after controlling for 
personal ability and family background based on Swedish dataset.54 Polidano 
                                                        
50 He argues that people are not willing to obtain the academic education although there 
is a wage premium compared to vocational education, because there is credit constraint 
among academic education. However, the determinants may change over time, especially 
with the development of the vocational education system in the UK. 
51 He divides the sample into general, academic, technical and business tracks under 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) track definitions. The last two are 
vocational education.  
The student’s background includes information regarding their history of attending 
vocational classes, the scores of courses and parental information, reported by 
administrators.  
52 They use parental education as an instrument to solve the endogeneity. 
53 See Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
54  They have used various methods to examine the differences, such as IV, 
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and Tabasso (2014) argue that the returns may depend on the type of the 
vocational training programs in Australia. Their results suggest that the 
classroom-based vocational education with workplace specific training may 
achieve higher school completion rates and employment transition after 
controlling the pre-training academic scores. Due to the multi-dimensional 
nature of the personal abilities, only by controlling the innate abilities in the 
same way could not capture the impacts of the abilities in terms of affecting the 
outcomes. 
The selection problem in relation to the study of the differences in the returns 
could be influenced by many factors. The simple OLS leaves the results hard to 
explain. Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2010) examine the effect of participating the 
vocational education on the returns on the basis of a natural experiment, 
launched in Romania. They argue that vocational students tend to have a lower 
employment rate and lower earnings compared to a general education. They 
argue that there are zero returns to the additional general education.55  
Based on a rich dataset, a growing literature has already examined the 
differences in employment outcomes. However, since the education selection is 
rather endogenous, parental information and early testing score may not meet 
the strict exclusion restriction. With much less informative data regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Hausman-Taylor estimators, fixed effect estimates and propensity score matching. Early 
scores are used as an approximation for ability. Parental information is used as IV.  
55 In order to address the selection bias, they use a natural education reform in Romania 
which pushed the vocational students into additional two years general education. 
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history of individuals, I examine the differences in returns on the basis of a 
quasi-experiment which was conducted in 1988 in the UK.  
 
3.3 Empirical strategy. 
There are no unified models for estimating the returns to vocational education. 
Some empirical papers investigated return to vocational qualifications based on 
the equation given the work of Hotchkiss (1993): 
𝒓𝒍𝒏𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊 = 𝒙𝒊𝜸 + 𝒗𝒐𝒄𝒊𝜷 + 𝜺𝒊                       (1) 
where “𝒓𝒍𝒏𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊” is individual’s log real wage. “𝒙𝒊” stands for individual and 
market’s characteristics. The “𝒗𝒐𝒄𝒊” equals one if one’s highest qualification is a 
vocational qualification and that is also the variable of interest.56 In this case, it 
stands for the total difference in returns between vocational education and 
academic education.  
In order to examine the stability and substitutability of the returns to vocational 
education, I examine the effect of increasing supply of university graduates on a 
vocational education by applying DID. I address the selection problem using the 
education expansion after 1988. There was a substantial increase in university 
enrollment after the reform was enacted (Walker and Zhu, 2008). The education 
expansion pushed many polytechnics and higher education colleges into 
                                                        
56 The ‘voc’ is defined as a dummy of vocationally related job or vocationally oriented 
program (Neuman and Ziderman 1999, Hotchkiss 1993). 
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becoming universities. It also relaxed the requirements for the new students. 
Those born after 1970 would have more opportunities to attend universities 
since they would be 18 years-old by 1988. On the other hand, the education 
expansion should not directly affect vocational education. Moreover, individuals 
who have vocational qualifications with working experiences may also become 
university graduates as a result of the reform. From my sample, the numbers of 
vocational students remain relatively constant between the 1965-1980 birth 
cohorts except for NVQs. The number of NVQs graduates increased significantly 
especially born after 1975.  
Compared to the previous results which include both academic and vocational 
students, I only include observations with vocational qualification as their 
highest qualification in the DID strategy. The merit of this construction is that we 
can focus on the impacts on the vocational education. Although only the 
academic students experienced the education expansion directly, the vocational 
students may also be affected as a result of the increasing university graduates. 
However, they may also face more risks of spillover effect and Skill Biased 
Technology Change (SBTC). Without a richer data, I limit the birth cohorts, trying 
to minimize the biases as a result of the other policies. Moreover, I also 
manipulate the treatment group in order to test the robustness of the results. 
There are numerous types of vocational qualification and it is always changing 
over time, making it difficult to accurately categorize the vocational 
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qualifications. Due to the limit of the data, I mainly examine the impacts on NVQ 
and BTEC. 57  The treatment group consists of higher levels of vocational 
qualification, including NVQ 5, NVQ4, NVQ3, BTEC higher, and BTEC national in 
my sample. The NVQ 3 and BTEC national belong to Level 3 which are similar to 
A-levels. Robustness checks have been done on the basis of the data without 
these marginal qualifications. 
The supply of university graduates increased significantly and varied over time 
arising from the education reform after 1988. The enforcement of the reform is 
complex and took years. One concern is that there are more returning students 
who went to universities after 1976. That may bias the results if it is not 
controlled. Moreover, the results are also biased due to the compositional change 
in the innate abilities. Without a comprehensive dataset, I narrow the length of 
the birth cohorts from 1965 to 1979 in order to minimize the biases. I divide the 
whole expansion into three periods, pre-expansion, during-expansion and 
post-expansion (Devereux and Fan, 2011), 1965-1970, 1970-1975 and 
1976-1980 respectively.  
The hypothesis is that the increasing supply of graduates will affect the 
employment outcomes of higher levels of vocational student. Intuitively those 
new graduates will compete with higher levels of the vocational student directly 
                                                        
57  Teaching and Nursing is a special class of vocational qualification. These 
qualifications are ranked higher in the data, but they are open to people with various 
education backgrounds, leading to rather ambiguous results. In this study, I don’t 
differentiate them separately. Moreover, the data doesn’t include higher levels of City & 
Guilds. In such case, there is no treated observations in the DID results. 
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and will decrease the returns to vocational education.  
𝒓𝒍𝒏𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕 = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜶 + 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝒉𝒗𝒊𝒕𝛄 + 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 ∙ 𝒉𝒗𝒊𝒕𝜹 + 𝜺𝒊   (5) 
“𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕” is denoted for individuals born after 1970. “𝒉𝒗𝒊𝒕” denotes for higher 
vocational qualifications, including NVQ 5, NVQ4, NVQ3, BTEC higher, and BTEC 
national. “𝒙𝒊𝒕” is the vector of control variables. The coefficient 𝜹 is our interest 
variable. It captures the effect of the education expansion on higher vocational 
qualifications. The algebra can be expressed as: 
𝛿 = (?̅?𝐻,2 − ?̅?𝐻,1) − (?̅?𝐿,2 − ?̅?𝐿,1) 
The first difference captures the effect of education expansion on the returns to 
individuals with higher vocational qualification. The second term captures 
common trend prior to the education expansion. 𝛿 will capture the effect of 
increasing university graduates on the returns to vocational education. The effect 
will be biased as a result of the compositional change between academic and 
vocational education and the personal ability bias from the education expansion. 
There are several limitations based on the methodologies and dataset I used in 
this chapter. A potential problem is the composition of vocational and academic 
students may have changed as a result of the policy. Although the policy will not 
affect vocational education directly, it increases the opportunity for some 
vocational students to pursue a degree. Walker and Zhu (2008) don’t find any fall 
in the premium for men and a large insignificant rise for female academic 
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students. Moreover, the newly recruited graduates may have a different personal 
innate ability and educational backgrounds compared to the previous university 
graduates. I also apply quantile DID and narrow down the scope of samples to 
minimize the potential biases. Third, the spillover effect may exist in the results 
as a result of the definition of the qualifications. In the nature of education, it is 
hard to compare different types of education accurately. In this study, it might be 
controversial that NVQ 3 and BTEC national belong to the higher vocational 
qualification. More robustness checks are needed.  
 
3.4 Data. 
The data is drawn from 2001-2013 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The 
sample is restricted to individuals aged between 22 and 60 years-old who are 
male and employed. In this chapter, the academic route consists of GCSE, A-level, 
first degree and higher degree. Other qualifications fall within the scope of 
vocational education. The vocational qualifications are rather diverse. In the 
study, I focus on the typical types of vocational qualification such as NVQs, BTECs, 
and City & Guilds. In other words, I only select workers who report themselves 
holding a vocational qualification as their highest qualification. The dependent 
variable is the log of the real hourly wage. It is constructed as gross pay during 
the last pay period divided by the number of working hours of that pay period. In 
the DID results, I narrow down the age band into 32-43 years-old as a result of 
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lack of common support and NVQs and BTECs since the data doesn’t contain City 
& Guilds which is at the similar level as a first degree. Table 3.1 is the summary of 
variables.  
<Table 3.1 Here> 
<Table 3.2 Here> 
Table 3.2 describes the comparison between types of qualification. The 
comparison is published by the UK government. It is used for the students and 
the employers to compare the qualifications. In QLFS, the variable doesn’t have 
the option for BTEC professional. 
<Figure 3.1 Here> 
Figure 3.1 describes the proportions of the student with different qualifications 
given birth cohorts. It clearly shows that the university participation rate has a 
sharp increase for the cohorts born after 1970 and share of GCSEs was 
decreasing at the same time as a result of the education expansion. The higher 
education expansion pushed more GCSE graduates into A-level graduates and 
then the universities. However, compared to the previous university graduates, 
the newly recruited graduates may have lower personal abilities (Walker and 
Zhu, 2008). Moreover, the compositional change may not be limited to innate 
personal ability but also induce more diverse educational backgrounds. It gives 
people more opportunities to access the higher education. On the other hand, the 
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proportion of vocational education students remain relatively constant except for 
NVQs since the NVQs were introduced during that periods. 
<Figure 3.2 Here> 
Figure 3.2 describes the proportions of qualifications in different occupations 
between 2001-2003 and 2011-2013. The proportion of NVQs increases 
significantly in the ten years compared to other types of vocational education. 
However, the proportion of academic education increases in general and the 
vocational education has lower proportions in the labour market. 
 
3.5 Empirical Results. 
3.5.1 OLS results. 
<Figure 3.3-3.5 Here> 
Figures 3.3 to 3.5 show the big picture of how the returns to vocational 
qualification change over the birth cohorts. The negative effects are accompanied 
by time effects and age effects. It describes the differences in returns between 
academic and vocational education over birth cohorts from 1960-1990. The 
returns to vocational qualifications are lower than the academic qualifications in 
general. But the negative effects decreased significantly with the birth cohorts 
except for BTEC. It is interesting to notice that the number of NVQs graduates 
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also increased in the labour market. On the other hand, the returns of BTEC fell 
since 1965. The decreasing returns might be due to the education expansion. 
Increasingly vocational students went to pursue a university degree. Moreover, 
the selection bias may also reduce the returns since those students who have 
better educational backgrounds and higher potential earnings may pursue a 
degree as a result of the reform, leading to the decreasing returns for the 
vocational students. Moreover, since the average education increased rapidly 
during this time period, increasing students obtained degree or more A-levels. 
The returns are quite complex during the periods since the structure of the 
education system changed and the demand for the skills too. However, the results 
show that the returns to vocational education increased in general. 
<Table 3.3 Here> 
Table 3.3 describes the returns to various types of vocational qualification by OLS. 
It includes dummies to identify the returns to NVQ, BTEC, City & Guilds, and 
other vocational qualifications compared to academic qualification at the same 
nominal level. The reason for selecting these three vocational qualifications is 
that they have higher proportions among numerous vocational qualifications. 
The first column describes the returns in the whole sample. The results suggest 
that the vocational education tends to have lower returns compared to academic 
education in general. The second column is the results on the basis of 25-34 
years-old between 2001 and 2003 QLFS. The third and fourth columns contain 
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2011-2013 and the sub-sample splits into 25-34 years-old and 35-45 years-old 
respectively. One of the merits of this arrangement is that the second column and 
the fourth column consist of a pseudo-panel and allow us to follow one cohort 
through their career after 10 years. In another word, the observations in the 
fourth column are the same birth cohort as the observations in the second 
column. The results suggest that the return to BTEC reduces significantly 
compared to other vocational qualifications. Although they have the lowest 
negative impact on vocational qualifications, they have the quickest decreasing 
rate in the middle of the career. Compared the third column with the second 
column, it shows that the returns to vocational qualifications decrease in general 
except for NVQs. That might be due to the fact that the NVQs were rapidly 
developing during that periods.  
 
3.5.2 DID results. 
<Table 3.4 Here> 
The first column includes all sample between 1965 and 1980. The second 
column contains sample between 1965 and 1975. The third column contains 
sample between 1965-1969 and 1976-1980. The results suggest that the 
education expansion of university graduates reduce the returns to vocational 
education. The negative effects are larger and more significant in the 
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post-expansion. The policies came out and became effective over time. There 
were more university graduates in the post-expansion. The simple comparison 
between the academic and the vocational education can be significantly biased 
due to the selection problem. The vocational students may have rather different 
innate abilities compared to academic students. In order to have a glimpse of the 
impacts of unobservable factors, I apply quantile regression with the DID 
strategy.  
<Table 3.5 Here> 
The results of quantile regression suggest that the unobservable factors play an 
important role in explaining the returns to qualifications. The returns to the 
higher vocational education increase with the quantile. The return to BTEC in the 
highest quantile is twice larger than the return on the lowest part. There no 
significant negative effects for the NVQs.  
<Table 3.6 Here> 
Table 3.6 shows the robustness check for the DID strategy. Compared to the 
previous results, I exclude the observations with NVQ 3 and BTEC national as 
their highest qualification since those qualifications are the marginal 
qualifications compared to a first degree. By excluding them we may examine 
whether the estimates change. In the results, both the magnitude and the 
significance of the results don’t change. The effects of the education expansion on 
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vocational education are stable.  
<Figure 3.6 Here> 
Figure 3.6 shows how the negative effects of holding vocational qualification over 
the birth cohorts. The results show that the negative effect becomes significant 
born after 1974. One explanation is that there were many polytechnics and 
higher education colleges becoming universities after the “Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992”. It pushed many graduates to become university graduates 
directly. The university graduates increased significantly after 1992 which is also 
the time when people who born in 1974 become eligible for higher education.  
 
3.6 Conclusion and limitations. 
In this chapter, I first examine the crude differences between different types of 
vocational education and academic education over time. The return to vocational 
education exists over time compared to the academic education. The negative 
effects also vary by the types of vocational education. The return to BTECs 
decreases along with the education reform. The returns to NVQs and City & 
Guilds increase continuously with the increasing numbers of NVQ qualifications. 
Although the return to vocational education might be biased due to the age effect 
and innate abilities, it describes the relative differences in returns between types 
of education over birth cohorts. Moreover, the vocational education tends to have 
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less promising career development in the future and the returns to vocational 
education become smaller in recent years.  
Second, the results suggest the education expansion has negative effects on the 
returns to vocational education. The negative effects are smaller and less 
significant in the during-expansion periods when there are fewer graduates 
compared to post-expansion periods, suggesting that the quantitative effect of 
increasing graduates reduce the returns to vocational education. 
In general, the results suggest that vocational education leads to lower earning 
compared to academic education in the middle of a career. The differences come 
from different educational backgrounds, personal abilities. The DID results 
suggest that the returns to vocational education are still affected by the 
over-supply of the university graduates. This chapter complements the literature 
in terms of the effects of educational expansion on vocational education. It 
implies that the overall effect of increasing university graduates on the society 
might be underestimated if it only counts the negative effects on university 
graduates. 
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Figures and Tables: 
 
Figure 3.1 Proportion of different qualifications  
 
Notes: Figure 3.1 includes all samples. It indicates the share of each qualification among the 
whole sample. 
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Figure 3.2 Vocational education in the workplace. 
 
 
Notes: Each bar represents the percentage of vocational qualifications. 
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Figure 3.3 Return to other vocational qualifications over time 
 
Notes: Control variables are education, experience, marriage, job training, disable, London, 
Full-time job, quarter, year, and industry. The control variables are the same in the following 
figures.  
 
Figure 3.4 Return to NVQ over time 
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Figure 3.5 Return to BTEC over time 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Returns to vocational education over birth cohorts 
 
Notes: Each par represents the coefficient with the confidence interval.  
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
VARIABLES Explanation Mean sd 
Age Age of individuals 40.76 10.21 
Firm50 If work in 0-49 company 0.436 0.499 
Firm500 If work in 50-499 company 0.376 0.484 
Firm1000 If work in 500-1000 company 0.188 0.391 
Marr If in marriage 0.619 0.486 
Edu Years of education 18.08 2.755 
Exp Work experience 22.68 11.11 
Disable If individuals are disable 0.129 0.335 
Jobtrain If receiving job related training 0.330 0.470 
Full Full time or part time job 0.773 0.420 
London If living in London 0.432 0.495 
Permanent Permanent job 0.957 0.204 
rlnwage Log of real wage 2.565 0.553 
Voc Vocational qualification 0.454 0.498 
Nvq Dummy for NVQ 0.119 0.324 
Btec Dummy for BTEC 0.075 0.264 
Cityguild 
Teaching 
Mature 
Dummy for City&Guilds 
Dummy for teaching&nursing 
Dummy for returning student 
0.037 
0.034 
0.459 
0.189 
0.182 
0.498 
 Obs: 481482   
Notes: Edu is individual’s education. Exp is experience. Birth is the year of birth. Disable, jobtrain, 
tenure, full, place, marr permanent, voc, and moti are dummies to identify if individuals have a 
disability, received job training from employers, have a full-time job, live in London, are married, 
have a permanent job, hold a vocational qualification and received their highest qualification with 
work experience respectively. Firm50, firm500, firm1000 are dummies to represent the scale of 
companies. The DID results are based on observation’s age from 32-43 years old since 
observations are only over-lapped in this age band.  
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Table 3.2 Qualification comparison 
NVQ level NVQ BTEC Equivalent (Academic) 
Qualification 
1 NVQ 1  BTEC 1 GCSE (D-G) 
2 NVQ 2 BTEC 2 GCSE (A-C), City & Guilds 2 
3 NVQ 3 BTEC professional 
award, certificate 
and diploma level 
3 
AS / A level, City & Guilds 3 
4 NVQ 4 BTEC professional 
award, certificate 
and diploma level 
4, 5, 6 
HNC/HND, Diploma, Bachelor’s 
degree, City & Guilds 
Licentiateship, Associateship, 
and graduateship 
5 NVQ 5 BTEC professional 
award, certificate 
and diploma level 
7 
Master’s degree, City & Guilds 
Membership and Fellowship 
Notes: See 
https://www.gov.uk/what-different-qualification-levels-mean/list-of-qualification-levels 
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Table 3.3 Returns to vocational education. 
 QLFS 
2001-2013 
QLFS 2001-2003 QLFS 2011-2013 QLFS 2011-2013 
VARIABLES All sample Aged 25-34 Aged 25-34 Aged 35-45 
     
nvq -0.202*** -0.147*** -0.128*** -0.244*** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
btec -0.019*** -0.027** -0.044*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) 
cityguild -0.165*** -0.143*** -0.102*** -0.220*** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.032) (0.021) 
othervoc -0.179*** -0.158*** -0.174*** -0.206*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) 
edu 0.066*** 0.086*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
exp 0.041*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.076*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
expsqua -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
moti 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.043*** 0.065*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
marr 0.111*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.115*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
jobtrain 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
disable -0.084*** -0.092*** -0.102*** -0.098*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) 
place 0.127*** 0.159*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
full 0.310*** 0.332*** 0.337*** 0.368*** 
 (0.005) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
Constant 0.584*** -0.045 0.231*** 0.069 
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 (0.012) (0.060) (0.065) (0.110) 
     
Observations 229,318 15,123 10,623 14,446 
R-squared 0.293 0.304 0.282 0.278 
Notes: Both vocational and academic qualifications are included in the OLS. Academic qualifications 
are the default variable in the regression. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 3.4 DID results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES QLFS 1965-1980 QLFS 1965-1975 QLFS 
(1965-1969) & 
(1976-1980) 
    
after 0.038* 0.044* 0.038 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.042) 
hvnvq 0.254*** 0.240*** 0.251*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) 
hvbtec 0.418*** 0.418*** 0.411*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
afterhvnvq -0.041* -0.011 -0.066** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.029) 
afterhvbtec -0.091*** -0.071*** -0.133*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) 
edu 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
exp 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
expsqua -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
moti -0.015 -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
marr 0.087*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
jobtrain 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
disable -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.069*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
place 0.131*** 0.141*** 0.131*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
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full 0.366*** 0.352*** 0.353*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.028) 
Constant 1.125*** 0.919*** 1.073*** 
 (0.119) (0.177) (0.191) 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
13133 
0.253 
 
9496 
0.240 
 
7319 
0.278 
Notes: In the DID strategy, only vocational qualifications are included. “hvnvq” stands for individual 
who hold a higher than NVQ 3 as highest qualification. “hvbtec” stands for individuals who hold a 
BTEC higher or a BTEC national. “afterhvnvq” and ”afterhvbtec” are the interaction terms and also the 
variable of interest. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5 Quantile DID 
VARIABLES 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
      
after 0.005 0.042* 0.020 0.018 0.027 
 (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) 
hvnvq 0.190*** 0.238*** 0.270*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) 
hvbtec 0.322*** 0.408*** 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.460*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) 
afterhvnvq -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 -0.031 -0.042 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) 
afterhvbtec -0.056** -0.089*** -0.071*** -0.065*** -0.107*** 
 (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.029) 
edu 0.009** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
exp 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
expsqua -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
moti 0.041*** 0.004 -0.022* -0.033*** -0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) 
marr 0.070*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.010*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
jobtrain 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
disable -0.082*** -0.106*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.066*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
place 0.113*** 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.149*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
full 0.398*** 0.390*** 0.352*** 0.347*** 0.276*** 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) 
Constant 0.737*** 0.892*** 1.150*** 1.198*** 1.746*** 
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 (0.174) (0.135) (0.131) (0.136) (0.181) 
      
Observations 
R-squared 
13,133 
0.132 
13,133 
0.164 
13,133 
0.169 
13,133 
0.163 
13,133 
0.155 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 DID robustness check 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All sample Pre-expansion Post-expansion 
    
after 0.0379* 0.0329 0.0451 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.045) 
hvnvq 0.260*** 0.247*** 0.256*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) 
hvbtec 0.452*** 0.451*** 0.443*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
afterhvnvq -0.045** -0.014 -0.076** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) 
afterhvbtec -0.094*** -0.073*** -0.140*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.030) 
edu 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
exp 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) 
expsqua -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
moti -0.034*** -0.031** -0.030* 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
marr 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
jobtrain 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.011) 
disable -0.079*** -0.072*** -0.050*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
place 0.130*** 0.140*** 0.126*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
full 0.349*** 0.342*** 0.356*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) 
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Constant 1.234*** 1.135*** 1.103*** 
 (0.127) (0.189) (0.207) 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
10914 
0.278 
 
7875 
0.267 
 
6036 
0.306 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 4 
Does age-dependent minimum wage affect employment? 
evidence from UK 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
The National Minimum Wage (NMW) in the UK was first introduced in 1999 with 
different rates for the age bands, 18-21 years-old and 22-years-old and above. 
The age-dependent minimum wage structure took its current form in 2004, 
when a lower rate of the minimum wage was introduced for 16-17 years old at 
than 18-21 years old band.58 The age-dependent minimum wage is used to 
regulate the flow of young workers into the labour market. By differentiating the 
minimum wage it may give employers incentives to recruit younger workers in 
favour of older workers in order to minimize the cost. Therefore, it may help 
younger workers into employment since they are the most vulnerable in the 
labour market. In the standard economics textbook, higher minimum wage 
results in reduced employment rate in a perfectly competitive labour market, 
where the marginal labour cost equals the marginal product of labour. On the 
other hand, in a monopsonistic labour market, marginal labour cost will exceed 
the wage rate with an upward-sloping labour supply.  
 
                                                        
58  In 2010, the adult minimum wage age cut-off changed from 22-years-old to 
21-years-old. 
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4.1.1 Effects on the stock of labour. 
Many studies have examined the effect of the introduction of the minimum wage 
on employment rate based on survey data or establishment level data (Card and 
Krueger, 1994; Machin et al, 2003; Stewart, 2004; Arulampalam et al, 2004; 
Dickens et al, 2015).59 A consensus on minimum wage is that a modest increase 
in minimum wage will not lead to a large reduction in employment empirically, 
whereas, it tends to compress the wage distribution (Machin et al, 2003).60  
One of the explanations for this disparity is that firms manage to reorganize the 
production process to offset the increasing minimum wage (Draca et al, 2011, 
Riley and Bondibene, 2017).61 However, a major weakness of the study based on 
survey data is the lack of examination of the compositional changes within firms 
(Gioliano, 2013). Gioliano (2013) examines the impact of increasing minimum 
                                                        
59 Stewart (2004) examines the effect of NMW on employment probability by using 
Difference-in-Difference (DID) based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and the New Earnings Surveys (NES) and 
concludes that there is no significantly negative effect on employment. While the results 
might be biased due to the spillover effect, Dickens and Manning (2004) argue that there 
is little evidence in terms of spillover effect. 
Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004) argue that there is little evidence that the 
introduction of the minimum wage will increase the job-related training. 
Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2015) examine the employment effect on the most 
vulnerable group in the UK, namely part-time females, based on QLFS and NES by using 
DID. They conclude that the increase in minimum wage will decrease the employment 
probability for part-time females and it will get worse in the recession. In their work, 
they also show that the effect of minimum wage can be very diverse depending on the 
groups. However, the ambiguous effect of Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) and 
new minimum wage still may bias the results. 
60 Card and Krueger (1994) examine the sign and magnitude of the effect of introducing 
minimum wage and explain the results in the context of monopsonistic power of firms. 
61 Riley and Bondibene (2017) examine the firm’s reaction toward to the increasing 
minimum wage in the UK based on Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data, which 
comprises more firms compared to Annual Survey of Hours and Earning (ASHE) (Draca 
et al, 2011). Following Draca et al (2011), they apply DID to firm-level data to separate 
the treatment group from control group on the basis of average labour costs. 
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wage on employment, especially focusing on teenagers. Given the unique 
personnel data from US retail firm, she concludes that the increase in relative 
minimum wage of teenagers raises teenager employment and the increase in 
average wage leads to a negative but statistically insignificant impact on overall 
employment. But many unaddressed questions on the effect of increasing 
minimum wage from different dimensions still remain (Metcalf 2008).  
 
4.1.2 Effects on the flow of labour. 
Another angle to study the impact of increasing minimum wage is to examine the 
flow of labour rather than the stock of labour. From recent literature, Brochu and 
Green (2013) argue that higher minimum wage is associated with lower hiring 
rate and lower job separation rate using Canadian data from 1979 to 2008. 
Unskilled workers are most likely affected by the increasing minimum wage.62 
Due to the limited numbers of provinces in Canada, the constructed province 
level variables can’t allow them to examine the bias arising from heterogeneity 
by which it is argued (Dube et al, 2016). Apart from the match quality model in 
Brochu and Green (2013), Dube et al (2016) apply the job-ladder model and 
                                                        
62 Their study differs from previous literature on three aspects. First, they study the 
transition rates before and after the change rather than in the transition. Second, they 
focus on the new hires who have less than one year tenure. Third, they also examine the 
impact on unemployed and inactive observations. Based on the Mortensen-Pissarides 
search and matching model, they argue that firms are less willing to terminate the 
contract because the opportunity cost of new search is higher after increasing minimum 
wage due to the cost of screening. 
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argue that the dis-employment effect of teenagers can be significantly changed 
due to the heterogeneous trends in the US. Their results suggest that increasing 
minimum wage has strong negative effects on job separation rate, job accession 
rates, and turnover rate but not on the stock of labour. Kabatek (2015) examines 
job accession rate and job separation rate based on regression discontinuity and 
individual-level administrative data. He argues that individuals may be made 
redundant shortly before becoming eligible for higher minimum wage level. 
Although the introduction of minimum wage and the flow of labour in the U.S. 
have been widely examined, we still know relatively little in terms of the effect on 
labour supply in the UK.  
 
4.1.3 Heterogeneous effects. 
To my knowledge, Dickens et al (2014) is the first the UK study that applies 
Regression Discontinuity (RD) to examine the effect of the increase in minimum 
wage on labour supply. Their results suggest that after becoming eligible for 
higher minimum wage rate, individuals have higher employment probability 
based on RD. Although their results are very robust, the increase in employment 
probability can’t be entirely explained by the increase in labour supply since 
employers may still reorganize production shortly after introducing the 
minimum wage. Moreover, the effects could be heterogeneous for sub-groups. 
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After becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate, individuals have a higher 
expected return, leading to higher search intensity and labour supply. According 
to the search and matching theory, it results in higher matching rate and 
productivity. The discontinuity also leads to more competition in the labour 
market when higher skilled workers and lower skilled workers increase labour 
supply at the same time. The exogenously increasing competition may induce a 
crowding out effect on lower-skilled workers when the labour market is tight 
(Dolado et al, 2000; Lene, 2011).63 Martin and Pierrard (2014) propose a 
theoretical model and argue that on-the-job search will lead firms to open more 
vacancies and crowd out unemployed workers in the job search. The crowding 
out effect may also depend on the tightness of the local labour market (Addison 
et al, 2013).64 The crowding out effect is still a controversial topic.65 Gautier et 
al (2002) find very thin evidence that higher-skilled workers crowd out 
lower-skilled workers during the recession in the Netherlands, although they do 
not focus on minimum rate level job.  
                                                        
63 Lene (2011) proposes a theoretical model to illustrate an increase in the supply of 
relatively high skilled workers will reduce employment opportunity for lower skilled 
workers. 
Dolado et al (2000) extend the search model (Van Ours and Ridder 1995) to explain the 
crowding out effect in Spain. But their assumption regarding leisure is perhaps too 
strong, since individuals will wait until they find a skilled job. 
64 However, crowding out effect is not easy to observe directly. Comparing employment 
probability over qualifications is ambiguous when higher skilled workers may find a job 
not covered by minimum wage. Given initial Figures of employment rate, minimum wage 
will mostly affect individuals with qualification below A-levels. Addison et al (2013) 
suggest that individuals with minimum wage rate hit mostly in recession.  
65 The crowding out effect being examined by the stock of labour is ambiguous to some 
extent. It may be explained more precisely by examining the flow of labour, turnover rate, 
job separation rate, and job accession rate.  
 
80 
Except for the employment probability, the types of a job may also imply different 
employment strength. A temporary job can be seen as a “stepping-stone” for the 
later job and is associated with a lower wage, lower job satisfaction, and 
on-the-job training opportunities compared to a more permanent job (Booth et 
al, 2002; Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005).66 After the increase in the expected 
return, individuals have more reasons to find a full-time or a permanent job 
(Card and Krueger, 1994; Nunez and Livanos, 2015).67 Individuals may search 
for a job starting from the “good” job, leading to a queue in each vacancy and 
those good jobs are filled up firstly after the matching between employee and 
employer. So the full-time or permanent job may illustrate the relative strength 
between different types of workers in the labour market.68  
 
4.1.4 The contribution. 
Compared to the previous literature, I examine the effect on employment 
                                                        
66 Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) argue that workers with a temporary contract may 
exert higher effort in order to transfer into a permanent contract under the hypothesis 
that employers will screen workers through temporary contract. 
67 Card and Krueger (1994) discuss the possible substitution between full time job and 
part time job due to both employee’s and employer’s motivation. 
68 Who are the compliers to this policy? Obviously, those who can find adult wage before 
becoming eligible for would not comply with this policy. They are the never-takers in 
terms of applied econometrics. Intuitively those whose reservation wages are lower than 
youth development minimum wage rate will always try to find a job even without the 
policy. So they are the always-takers. It is expected that those observations whose 
reservation wage are higher than development minimum wage rate but lower than adult 
minimum wage will step into labour market or have more desire to find a job. Falk et al 
(2006) show that there is a strong relation between minimum wage and reservation 
wages based on their unique laboratory experimental data. They argue that the 
increasing reservation wage doesn’t decrease even after the temporarily increasing 
minimum wage falls. 
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probability in subgroups and highlight the possibility of a crowding out effect in 
the recession brought by higher competition after becoming eligible for higher 
minimum wage rate. The increasing minimum wage will increase the labour 
supply and also increase the competition between different groups, leading to 
crowding out effect. 
Compared to Dickens et al (2014) which examine the effects on the whole, lower 
skilled group, I divide the lower skilled workers into subgroups on the basis of 
their qualifications and the results show that there exists heterogeneous effects 
given their qualifications after becoming eligible for the higher minimum wage 
rate. Since the samples are mainly from the “Great Recession” period, the 
probability of the crowding out effect is also highlighted in this chapter. Moreover, 
I also discuss more potential biases to the results and other potential 
employment effects which have been neglected in the previous literature. The 
main results suggest that there is no effect on the employment probability among 
individuals whose highest qualification is below GCSE. Among the GCSE group, 
the positive discontinuity comes from individuals with 5 or more GCSEs and 
there is no significant effect for individuals with less than 5 GCSEs. As a potential 
bias for RD results, lower skilled workers might be made redundant (Kabatek, 
2015). I examine the discontinuity shortly before the age threshold and the 
results suggest that there are no replacement effects among employees in the UK. 
After disaggregating the results by male or female, the discontinuity focuses on 
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the male. Moreover, individuals with higher numbers or better grades of GCSE 
tend to have a higher probability of finding a full-time job or permanent job after 
becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate. Individuals with lower skills 
don’t have any significant discontinuity. The results suggest that policy makers 
should take those possible non-negligible adverse effects into consideration.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The methodology is discussed in section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 introduces the dataset. The results are presented and discussed in 
section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Regression discontinuity regression. 
RD design is a quasi-experimental design in which the probability of receiving 
treatment will be changed discontinuously across the threshold as a function of 
control variables (Hahn et al 2001). It is an increasingly popular method in 
applied econometrics (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). However, in this study, one 
potential problem is that the distance is recorded as monthly rather than daily 
(discrete to some extent), leading to potential ambiguous bias into the results 
(Lee and Card, 2008). 
In this chapter, I examine the age discrimination based on discontinuity around a 
well-defined age cut-off. As for the econometric model, I apply interaction 
between the discontinuity dummy and the distance to the cut-off point to allow 
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for the slope changing after crossing the age threshold, using constant, linear, and 
quadratic models.69 This econometric framework exploits the discrimination 
from employers based on sharp regression discontinuity model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑎 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑎 + 𝛿(𝑎) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑎                                (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑎 is outcome variable for individual i of age a.  𝑋𝑖  are the control 
variables. Probit model is used to evaluate the effects. Here TREAT is our interest 
variable, indicating the effect of discontinuity. It equals to one if an individual is 
eligible for the higher minimum wage. 𝛽 is the effect of discontinuity induced by 
the increasing minimum wage. 𝛿(𝑎) is called time function which captures the 
effect of duration. A key assumption in RD strategy is that 𝛿 (𝑎) is a continuous 
function. The samples before and after birthday are assumed to be randomly 
assigned. That guarantees the treatment variable is the only source of 
discontinuity.  
𝛿(𝑎) = 𝜃1𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜃2𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 + 𝜃3𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 + 𝜃4(𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇)2 (2) 
It is difficult to select time control function. Here robust tests in practice are 
necessary. By including control variables to minimize the error term we need to 
mimic the parametric form. Under the parametric framework, the estimates 
might be biased due to exogeneity. After the test of the validity of RD design, the 
control variables are used to decrease the variability. We can also decrease the 
                                                        
69 Non-parametric smoothing is not applied here due to the limit of the data. 
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bias by narrowing down the window length to some extent, but the number of 
observations is decreasing as well. This is the tradeoff between precision and 
bias. 
The essence of RD is to compare the treatment group on the right-hand side of 
the cut-off point and comparison group on the left side of the cut-off point. The 
control group from marginally below the threshold is valid counterfactual for the 
treatment group from marginally above the threshold (Hahn et al, 2001). Around 
the threshold, the treatment status is independent of all variables no matter 
observable and unobservable like a random assignment (Lee, 2008). Here the 
instruments are the distances to the month of birth. Put it differently, individuals 
have imprecise control of the treatment status. In this case, the randomness of 
the month of birth can guarantee the randomness of the treatment from the 
threshold.  
This chapter focuses on the effect of labour supply when individuals become 
eligible for the higher minimum wage rate. In this chapter, I examine the effect of 
the increasing minimum wage on labour supply and the effect on finding 
different types of job for different demographic groups. 
One assumption here is that there is no administrative cost for employer 
associated with firing and hiring, since the employer may prefer existing workers 
or workers who are already eligible for the higher minimum wage if the 
administrative is non-negligible. The discontinuity would be larger when this 
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employer’s preference exists. In this case, it is a rather empirical question and it 
is a reliable assumption since employer posts a job given their labour demand of 
production process and the workers across cut-off point would be identical to 
employers.  
Another potential bias comes from the employer’s motivation for replacement 
shortly before workers become eligible for higher minimum wage rate. It is 
ambiguous since employer’s firing decision may not only depend on individual’s 
age but also their own production process. 70  Kabatek (2015) argue the 
discontinuity might be the artificial results induced by replacement. In my 
chapter, I examine the replacement effect by running regressions on the periods 
shortly before the age threshold. The evidence suggests that a significant 
replacement effect is not found in the UK based on Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (QLFS).71 I will discuss this issue in details later and put the results into 
the appendix.  
Moreover, individuals may change their labour supply behaviour before 
becoming eligible for the higher minimum wage rate. The anticipation effect will 
lead to biased results. Dickens et al (2014) intensively discuss the potential 
motivation behind anticipation behaviour and check the effect based on 
                                                        
70 It is an empirical and complex issue and it may exist to some extent, although a more 
important issue is the magnitude of replacement. 
71 Moreover, there is no significant change from the perspective of macro-economy 
given the current data generating process. My whole samples are in a recessionary 
period. All of those I described above make sure that there is no change in demand side 
across the cut-off point. 
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Difference-in-Difference among 20 years old compared with 21 years old before 
and after the introduction of the policy. They argue that the effect is small when 
they become eligible for higher minimum wage rate.  
Third, the policy regarding the probationary period before a permanent contract 
may also bring potential bias into the results since employers may have the 
motivation to recruit more workers when the hiring or firing cost is lower when 
workers are in probation. In other words, employers may take advantage of the 
probation rule to recruit more workers 6 months before the age threshold at 
22th birthday under the assumption that employers have maximum 6 months to 
screen worker’s full productivity. If probation effect exists, then it will upward 
bias the results. I examine this effect based on DID and don’t find significant 
probation effect in the sample. The results are in the appendix2.  
Lastly, the results might be also biased by time effect and kink effect (Fidrmuc 
and Tena, 2013; Dong, 2016).72 The time effect mainly comes from the changing 
employment strength over time, leading to the failure of Conditional 
Independence assumption (CIA) of running variable.73 Due to the limit of the 
data in this study, the simplest way to minimize the bias coming from time effect 
                                                        
72 Dong (2016) proves that kink effect can also make a significantly artificial jump 
around the cut-off point. 
73 The age effect could be checked and corrected by applying inverse probability 
weighting and the conditional independence test could also be applied (Angrist and 
Rokkanen, 2015). Alternatively, augmented inverse probability weighting (AIPW) can be 
implemented as it includes all set of information both in the propensity score and the 
outcome function. Under the assumption that propensity score and outcome function 
are correctly estimated, AIPW would be unbiased for ATE (Glynn and Quinn, 2010). 
However, it does need a more comprehensive dataset to illustrate the demographic 
characteristics across the threshold. 
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is to narrow down the periods around the cut-off point and apply polynomial 
terms to mimic the pattern.  
 
4.3 Data and statistics. 
I pool five years QLFS together from 2008 to 2012. It contains month of birth 
which is used to calculate the distance from the month of the survey to the month 
of birth. Before Oct 2010, an increase in minimum wage is due on one’s 22nd 
birthday, but the age threshold is changed into 21-years-old after 2010. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are 21-years-old or 22-years old before 
2010 or 20-years-old and 21-years-old after 2010. Observations are ranked on 
the basis of their distances between the month of the survey to the month of 
birth. There might be a non-negligible effect on employment probability of 
individuals with lower levels of education.74 Therefore, instead of focusing on 
18-years-old threshold, the effect of the increase in minimum wage on 
employment probability of individuals who are turning into 21-years-old is 
cleaner. In order to get rid of the measurement bias, I drop individuals whose 
month of birth equals to month of survey since it is unclear if individuals have 
passed their birthday. 
 
                                                        
74 A-level graduates may also find a job in the range of minimum wage. 
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4.4 Results. 
4.4.1 Employment probability. 
Individuals with lower levels of education are expected to be more affected by 
the increasing minimum wage. Although individuals with more years of 
education may still find a job which is paid around the minimum wage, the 
employment probability of individuals with A-levels are not largely affected by 
minimum wage in my results. The main results focus on the whole sample 
regardless of their sex, mostly due to limited sample size. After splitting on male 
or female, the results are less robust. In order to balance between bias and 
efficiency, I examine the discontinuity in different periods and add different 
polynomial terms as a time function.  
Figure 4.1 describes the employment rates given different qualifications on the 
basis of distances. The upper left figure is the employment rate of individuals 
with qualification lower than GCSE. Upper right and lower left are the 
employment rates of individuals with fewer than five GCSEs and five or more 
GCSEs, respectively. The last is for individuals whose highest qualification is 
A-level. From the simple pattern of employment rates, there is no clear evidence 
in terms of the relation between minimum wage and employment probability for 
individuals with any qualifications except for individuals with five or more GCSEs. 
They have a clearer increasing trend when they are eligible for higher minimum 
wage rate. Obviously, A-level students tend to have better chances to get a job 
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compared with individuals with less education. Results for individuals with 
qualification lower than GCSE are rather ambiguous since it includes a variety of 
qualification. Putting it here is to show the continuity of qualifications. 
<Figure 4.1 Here> 
Table 4.1 shows the Probit regression results of individuals with qualification 
lower than GCSE and GCSEs. The parameter of “TREAT” variable in equation (1) 
is shown in the table and those are the discontinuities due to the age-dependent 
threshold. The discontinuities are shown on the basis of constant, linear, and 
quadratic polynomial terms in the time function and different window length to 
show the robustness of the results. The outcome variable is an employment 
dummy. And the left and right panels are based on the highest qualifications of 
individuals.  
It suggests that the increase in minimum wage doesn’t incur any changes in 
employment probability for individuals below GCSE who are the lowest levels of 
education among the sample. But qualifications below GCSE are very ambiguous 
since the qualifications are very diverse. There is a most robust positive effect for 
individuals with GCSE. Individuals with GCSEs have higher employment 
probability after becoming eligible for the higher minimum wage rate. The 
following results show that the significance mainly comes from individuals with 
higher numbers or better scores of GCSEs. 
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<Table 4.1 Here> 
Table 4.2 presents the results of individuals with GCSEs as their highest 
qualification. The significant results concentrate on the individuals with higher 
qualifications. And the results are more significant on constant and linear terms. 
With higher polynomial terms, there is a risk of over-fitting. Individuals with five 
or more GCSEs have more employment probability after they become eligible for 
higher minimum wage rate, but there is no significant effect on individuals with 
less than five GCSEs. It suggests that increasing minimum wage will result in 
higher skilled workers getting into employment. There is a significant difference 
between the individuals with a higher number of GCSEs and a lower number of 
GCSEs. Since the level of education is very close for these two groups of people, 
their motivation for finding a job should be identical. It may imply that lower 
skilled-workers have less advantage for being employed after increasing the 
minimum wage, making them less attractive. To further testify the results, I also 
divided individuals regarding their grades of GCSE. Individuals with A-C GCSE 
still have an edge in gaining employment opportunities compared to individuals 
with D-G GCSEs. This evidence may imply that there is a crowding out effect from 
individuals with higher or better qualifications. 
<Table 4.2 Here> 
Figure 4.2 shows the predicted employment probability given different periods 
for individuals with higher numbers and grades of GCSE and it is calculated by 
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the mean of individual’s employment probability given distances. The upper 
figure is the employment probability of individuals with five or more GCSEs. The 
lower figure is the employment probability of individuals with A-C GCSEs. Across 
the threshold, there is a clear jump of about 5% caused by the increasing 
minimum wage.  
<Figure 4.2 Here> 
Figure 4.3 shows the employment probability of individuals with less than five 
GCSEs and D-G GCSEs. The evidence of individuals with lower levels of education 
is not as strong as for higher levels of education. The effect might be a combined 
composition effect of the increasing minimum wage and crowding out effect. 
<Figure 4.3 Here> 
Table 4.3 gives estimates of the discontinuity in terms of number of GCSEs held 
by employed individuals and proportion of 5+ GCSEs. It is not an exact number of 
GCSE but a categorical variable associated with the number of GCSEs. Compared 
to the previous results, it shows the crowding out effect directly. Across the 
cut-off point, both results show a slight positive discontinuity, suggesting that 
individuals in employment on the right-hand-side of the cut-off holding more 
GCSEs compared to the left-hand-side. But the results are not significant 
compared to the employment probability results. It may be due to the magnitude 
of the crowding out effect. 
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<Table 4.3 Here> 
 
4.4.2 Which job? 
The different types of a job may also indicate the relative employment strength. It 
is crucial for young workers since the type of job has a significant influence on 
their return and stability, as well as the accumulation of human capital. 
Investigating the type of job will deepen the understanding of the employment 
probability across different groups. I investigate the probability of finding a 
full-time or a permanent job after becoming eligible for the higher minimum 
wage rate. Firstly, I examine the employment probability of finding a full-time job. 
But a full-time job can be a temporary as well and a permanent position could be 
a part-time job either. Moreover, I examine the employment probability of finding 
full-time permanent job.  
Figure 4.4 is the proportion of individual in a full-time job given qualifications, 
like Figure 4.1. In Figure 4.4, individuals having qualifications less than GCSE and 
A-level don’t have significant difference across the cut-off point. But for 
individuals with lower and higher numbers of GCSEs, there are clear trends for 
these two groups. Individuals with higher numbers of GCSEs have a higher 
probability of finding a full-time job after becoming eligible for higher minimum 
wage rate. Similar to the results of employment probability, the proportion of 
 
93 
individuals with fewer numbers of GCSEs of finding a full-time job decreases 
after becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate. Figure 4.5 shows the 
proportion of individual having a full-time permanent job. The pattern is quite 
similar to Figure 4.4. 
<Figure 4.4 Here> 
<Figure 4.5 Here> 
From Table 4.4 to 4.6 I present the results of employment probabilities for 
different types of job given qualifications. There is more evidence for higher 
skilled workers finding a full-time permanent job compared with lower skilled 
workers. Together with Figure 4.4 and 4.5, I conclude that higher-skilled workers 
tend to find a full-time permanent job after the increase in minimum wage. 
However, there is no significant increase in the proportion of full-time permanent 
job for lower-skilled workers. Given the assumption I described above, both 
types of worker have similar motivation toward to a more full-time permanent 
job. The results of lower-skilled workers could be explained by a composition 
effect, combing with the effect of the increasing labour supply and crowding out 
effect.  
<Table 4.4 Here> 
<Table 4.5 Here> 
<Table 4.6 Here> 
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4.4.3 Robustness and sensitivity check. 
In order to test the sensitivity of the discontinuity, I run regressions based on 
different window lengths and polynomial terms. The more robust results are also 
significant after changing the window lengths and adding different polynomial 
terms.  
To further check the sensitivity of the above results, I examine the effect on male 
and female separately. The results are shown in the appendix.  
<Table 4.7 Here> 
From Table 4.7, the discontinuity is more pronounced for males than for females. 
The pattern is also evident in the following figures of employment rate and 
predicted employment probability.  
One of the purposes of age-dependent minimum wage is to allow the employers 
to discriminate workers by their age to minimize the cost. In another word, 
employers have the motivation to replace the older workers with the younger. In 
order to test the replacement effect, I run regressions on the basis of 
discontinuity of both -1 (d(-1))and -2 (d(-1)) months before the cut-off point 
where they become eligible for the higher minimum wage rate. The 
discontinuities are shown in Table 4.8. It is expected that the discontinuity will 
have a negative value if there exists displacement effect since employers will 
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make workers redundant shortly before workers become eligible for the higher 
minimum wage rate. Here I examine the discontinuity for A-C GCSEs and D-G 
GCSEs followed by previous results. The results show that there is no significant 
discontinuity in two groups around the age threshold. It suggests that there are 
not strong replacement effects existing one month or two months before the 
threshold directly. A more indirect result suggests that crowding out effect starts 
one month before the cut-off point and employment probability doesn’t have any 
discontinuity before threshold, because lower-skilled workers may be made 
redundant to some extent. 
<Table 4.8 Here> 
Moreover, to test the robustness, I also did the regressions on 21 and 23 years old 
to examine the discontinuity which should not exist. It increases more 
creditability to the story. 
<Table 4.9 Here> 
There were several policies coming out during the sample periods. Those may 
have subtle effects on the unemployment rate. Especially the unemployment rate 
in 2008 is still much lower compared to 2009 when it peakedand the higher level 
of unemployment rate holds constant until 2013.  
 
4.4.4 Working hours. 
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Employees and employers will negotiate working hours based on each other’s 
needs. It may also reflect the relation between each other. By the nature of RD, 
we can observe the discontinuity mainly caused by employees.  
<Table 4.10 Here> 
From the results of Table 4.10, we can see that an increase in minimum wage 
doesn’t have a significant effect on lower-skilled workers. However, male 
workers with higher levels of skill tend to increase working hours and there is no 
significant discontinuity for females. It is also shown in Figure 4.6 which pictures 
the average working hours based on their qualification and distance to the 
threshold.  
<Figure 4.6 Here> 
More working hours of higher skilled workers may be caused by the higher 
proportion of full-time job among them. The interesting part is there is 
surprisingly no significant increase in working hours among lower-skilled 
workers considering that they have lower probabilities ending with a full-time 
job.  
One possible explanation is that the increase in working hours of a part-time job 
has been offset by a lower full-time participation rate. Another possible 
explanation is that their working hours have already met both workers and 
employer’s full capacity. Even though they tend to have higher wage after 
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becoming eligible for the higher minimum wage, they can’t increase working 
hours to increase income further. That implies that they may also want to find a 
full-time job with the higher expected return, but it is hard for them to find one 
due to higher competition after the increasing minimum wage.  
One has to ask if minimum wage will effectively decrease income inequality? 
Even though their employment probability may not be affected significantly, the 
working condition and benefit may also be affected, especially in a bad time.  
 
4.5 Conclusions. 
This chapter enhances the literature by examining the effect of becoming eligible 
for adult minimum wage rate on employment probability for different groups 
and argues that the discontinuities are heterogeneous and the possible crowding 
out effect, caused by the increasing minimum wage. There is a strong evidence of 
heterogeneous effects by qualifications. The results suggest that there are no 
significant effects of an increasing minimum wage on the employment 
probability for individuals below GCSE and the significant discontinuity mainly 
comes from higher skilled workers. Individuals with higher numbers or grades of 
GCSE have a higher probability of being employed after the minimum wage 
increase. There are no significant effects for individuals with lower numbers or 
grades of GCSE. The number of GCSEs held by employed individuals and the 
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proportion of 5+ GCSEs among employed workers increase across the threshold, 
suggesting that there is a crowding out effect. Moreover, the results also don’t 
show that there exists significant replacement effect shortly before the age 
threshold. 
Besides the general improvement in employment opportunity, the results also 
strongly suggest that higher-skilled workers tend to find a full-time permanent 
job after becoming eligible for higher minimum wage rate. The evidence of 
higher employment probability and higher satisfying job accession probability 
may imply that there is a crowding out effect coming from higher skilled workers. 
On the other hand, there is no evidence in terms of lower-skilled workers being 
made redundant.  
However, the limited information of the dataset does not allow me to examine the 
replacement effect in more details or labour flows in general. With data in a 
booming period, one might expect more variation between the local 
unemployment rate and the employment probability. 
The implication of this chapter is that we should not neglect the possible adverse 
effects of the increase in minimum wage, especially in a recessionary period. Due 
to a tighter labour market, the discontinuity caused by increasing minimum wage 
will not only increase labour supply but also result in less chance for 
disadvantaged workers in labour market. Moreover, even though the negative 
effect of minimum wage is limited on average, the negative effect in subgroups 
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may be still non-negligible. The results imply that exogenous increase in 
competition may have both immediate and long-term negative effects on 
disadvantaged workers. The minimum wage policy should be more flexible in a 
tighter labour market. 
More work is needed in the future. The RD design could be more flexible and 
convincing if day of birth is available to construct the distances. Moreover, the 
stock of employment could be ambiguous. It might be clearer to examine 
crowding out effect by examining the flow of labour, but that requires a more 
comprehensive dataset.  
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Figures and Tables: 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Probability of being employed by qualifications 
 
Notes: The variable “less than GCSE” includes individuals whose highest qualification is lower 
than GCSE according to variable 'HIQUAL' in QLFS. Lower number of GCSE includes individuals 
whose highest qualification is GCSE and hold less than 5 GCSEs. Higher number of GCSE includes 
individuals whose highest qualification is GCSE and hold five or more GCSEs. Distances include 
-11 to 11 from the month of survey to the month of birth.  
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Figure 4.2 Estimated probability of employment for A-C or 5+ of GCSE 
 
Notes: The Figure plots the estimated average probability of employment rate which is calculated 
by averaging individual’s estimated employment probability on the basis of distances. 
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Figure 4.3 Estimated probability of employment for D-G or 5- GCSE 
 
Notes: The Figure plots the estimated average probability of employment rate that is calculated 
by averaging individual’s estimated employment probability on the basis of distances. 
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Figure 4.4 Employment rate for individuals with a full-time job 
 
Notes: The Figure plots the employment rate of full-time job. Sample includes inactive, 
unemployed, Part-time job, and Full-time job. 
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Figure 4.5 Employment rate for individuals with a full-time permanent job 
 
Notes: The Figure plots the employment rate of both full-time and permanent job. All samples are 
included. 
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Figure 4.6 Working hours of 5- or 5+ workers 
 
Notes: The Figure plots the working hours in different types of qualification. Only GCSE workers 
are considered. 
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Figure 4.7 Proportion of higher levels occupation 
 
Notes: Distances are calculated by the subtraction between month of job started and month of 
birth at the 21nd birthday. Students are not included. All observations are employed. 
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Table 4.1 Employment probability of GCSE and below GCSE 
 Employ (less than GCSE) Employ (GCSE) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.069* 
[0.037] 
0.062 
[0.050] 
0.001 
[0.088] 
0.080** 
[0.030] 
  0.084** 
  [0.040] 
0.448 
[0.071] 
Linear 0.025 
[0.080] 
-0.074 
[0.115] 
-0.065 
[0.283] 
0.107* 
[0.064] 
  0.088 
  [0.092] 
0.686** 
[0.228] 
Quadratic -0.054 
[0.136] 
0.017 
[0.222] 
 0.057 
[0.109] 
  0.181 
  [0.180] 
 
       
Observatio
n  
4842 2618 638 7297   3968 1332 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in employment. The category of less than 
GCSE includes individuals with qualification lower than GCSE according to variable of “HIQUAL” in 
QLFS and GCSE includes all individuals whose highest qualification is GCSE. The results are based on 
different polynomial terms and window length. Control variables are local unemployment, dummy 
for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%;  
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Table 4.2 Employment probability of subgroups 
 Employ (5- GCSEs) Employ (5+ GCSEs) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.045 
[0.038] 
0.037 
[0.052] 
-0.067 
[0.095] 
0.119** 
[0.048] 
0.150** 
[0.066] 
0.230** 
[0.111] 
Linear 0.050 
[0.083] 
-0.011 
[0.121] 
1.10*** 
[0.309] 
0.193* 
[0.104] 
0.225* 
[0.148] 
0.277 
[0.362] 
Quadratic -0.060 
[0.142] 
0.267 
[0.235] 
 0.271 
[0.176] 
0.087 
[0.286] 
 
       
Observatio
n  
4365 2357 759 2932 1611 573 
       
       
 Employ (GCSEs D-G)  Employ (GCSEs A-C)  
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant -0.001 
[0.068] 
-0.065 
[0.094] 
-0.244 
[0.165] 
0.098*** 
[0.033] 
0.119** 
[0.045] 
0.117 
[0.079] 
Linear -0.118 
[0.145] 
-0.257 
[0.212] 
0.607 
[0.547] 
0.171** 
[0.072] 
0.193* 
[0.104] 
0.073** 
[0.257] 
Quadratic -0.340 
[0.247] 
0.135 
[0.410] 
 0.181 
[0.123] 
0.206 
[0.202] 
 
       
Observatio
n  
1400 755 119 5897 3213 1077 
       
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in employment. The category of 5- GCSE 
includes individuals with less than 5 GCSE and 5+ GCSE includes individuals with five or more 
GCSE. The results are based on different polynomial terms and window length. Control variables 
are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%;  
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Table 4.3 Crowding out effect 
 Number of GCSE Proportion of 5+ GCSEs 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.052** 
[0.023] 
0.064** 
[0.032] 
0.067 
[0.055] 
0.048** 
[0.019] 
0.048* 
[0.026] 
0.026 
[0.046] 
Linear 0.077 
[0.051] 
0.095 
[0.073] 
-0.025 
[0.177] 
0.047 
[0.042] 
0.023 
[0.061] 
-0.080 
[0.148] 
Quadratic 0.091 
[0.086] 
-0.052 
[0.142] 
 -0.009 
[0.072] 
-0.086 
[0.118] 
 
       
Observatio
n  
16631 9060 3026 16631 9060 3026 
Notes: The dependent variable are the full time of numbers of GCSE and if individuals hold five or 
more GCSE. Only employed observations are included and the observations are restricted with 
less than 20 years continuous education in order to get rid of the effects of new graduates who 
have much higher years of education. The results are based on different polynomial terms and 
window length. Control variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, 
and years. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%;  
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Table 4.4 Job type of individuals with less than GCSE and GCSE 
 Full (less than GCSE) Permanent-Full (less than GCSE) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.120** 
[0.039] 
0.124** 
[0.053] 
0.064 
[0.095] 
0.123** 
[0.040] 
0.122** 
[0.058] 
0.053 
[0.097] 
Linear 0.073 
[0.084] 
-0.016 
[0.123] 
0.240 
[0.304] 
0.075 
[0.086] 
0.018 
[0.125] 
0.277 
[0.312] 
Quadratic 0.038 
[0.144] 
0.254 
[0.234] 
 0.068 
[0.147] 
0.155 
[0.238] 
 
       
Observation 4842 2618 864 4842 2618 864 
       
       
       
 Full (GCSE) Permanent-Full (GCSE) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.106*** 
[0.030] 
0.094** 
[0.040] 
0.042 
[0.071] 
0.111*** 
[0.030] 
0.111** 
[0.040] 
0.060 
[0.071] 
Linear 0.088 
[0.064] 
0.064 
[0.092] 
0.428* 
[0.229] 
0.117* 
[0.091] 
0.098 
[0.092] 
0.477 
[0.228] 
Quadratic 0.022 
[0.108] 
0.095 
[0.178] 
 0.055 
[0.109] 
0.093 
[0.179] 
 
       
Observation 7292 3968 1332 7292 3968 1332 
       
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in full-time job or both full-time and 
permanent job. The results are based on different polynomial terms and window length. Control 
variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%;  
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Table 4.5 Job type of individuals with lower numbers or grades of GCSE 
 Full (D-G GCSE) Permanent-Full (D-G GCSE) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant -0.003 
[0.069] 
-0.073 
[0.096] 
-0.165 
[0.167] 
0.14 
[0.070] 
-0.052 
[0.096] 
  -0.085 
  [0.168] 
Linear -0.109 
[0.149] 
-0.233 
[0.218] 
-0.017 
[0.560] 
-0.058 
[0.150] 
-0.056 
[0.219] 
  0.106 
  [0.563] 
Quadratic -0.257 
[0.252] 
0.004 
[0.419] 
 -0.158 
[0.252] 
0.071 
[0.425] 
 
       
Observation  1400 755 255 1400 755 255 
       
       
 Full (5- GCSEs) Permanent-Full (5- GCSEs) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.044 
[0.039] 
0.053 
[0.053] 
-0.034 
[0.096] 
0.044 
[0.039] 
0.064 
[0.053] 
0.003 
[0.095] 
Linear 0.060 
[0.084] 
-0.026 
[0.123] 
0.688** 
[0.311] 
0.091 
[0.084] 
0.041 
[0.123] 
0.797** 
[0.311] 
Quadratic -0.079 
[0.144] 
0.099 
[0.238] 
 -0.008 
[0.144] 
0.155 
[0.238] 
 
       
Observation  4365 2357 388 4365 2357 388 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in full-time job or both full-time and 
permanent job. The results are based on different polynomial terms and window length. Control 
variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%;  
 
 
 
 
 
112 
Table 4.6 Job type of individuals with higher numbers or grades of GCSE 
 Full (A-C GCSE) Permanent-Full (A-C GCSE) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.130*** 
[0.033] 
0.130** 
[0.045] 
0.092 
[0.079] 
0.132*** 
[0.033] 
 0.144*** 
  [0.066] 
  0.091 
  [0.079] 
Linear 0.137** 
[0.071] 
0.156 
[0.103] 
0.552** 
[0.256] 
0.161** 
[0.071] 
  0.145 
  [0.103] 
  0.572** 
  [0.256] 
Quadratic 0.128 
[0.121] 
0.143 
[0.199] 
 0.116 
[0.121] 
  0.121 
  [0.199] 
 
       
Observation  5897 3213 524 5897 3213 524 
       
       
 Full (5+ GCSEs) Permanent-Full (5+ GCSEs) 
 22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
22 
months 
12 
months 
4 
months 
Constant 0.179*** 
[0.047] 
0.145** 
[0.064] 
0.177 
[0.110] 
0.190*** 
[0.047] 
0.169** 
[0.064] 
0.166 
[0.109] 
Linear 0.117 
[0.100] 
0.198 
[0.143] 
0.176 
[0.254] 
0.142 
[0.101] 
0.176 
[0.220] 
0.098 
[0.352] 
Quadratic 0.194 
[0.169] 
0.115 
[0.275] 
 0.168 
[0.170] 
0.033 
[0.277] 
 
       
Observation  2932 1611 573 2932 1611 573 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in full-time job or both full-time and 
permanent job. The results are based on different polynomial terms and window length. Control 
variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%;  
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Table 4.7 Employment probability for male and female 
 Employ (less than GCSE) Employ (GCSE) 
 Male Female Male Female 
 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 
Constant 0.078* 
[0.050] 
0.111 
[0.069] 
0.042 
[0.055] 
0.014 
[0.075] 
0.099** 
[0.041] 
0.104* 
[0.056] 
0.055 
[0.043] 
0.046 
[0.059] 
Linear 0.067 
[0.109] 
-0.114 
[0.157] 
-0.017 
[0.120] 
-0.054 
[0.174] 
0.116 
[0.088] 
0.064 
[0.128] 
0.075 
[0.095] 
0.088 
[0.137] 
Quadratic -0.055 
[0.185] 
0.070 
[0.302] 
-0.078 
[0.205] 
-0.100 
[0.333] 
-0.001 
[0.150] 
0.103 
[0.248] 
0.094 
[0.163] 
0.209 
[0.269] 
Observations  2569 1402 2273 1216 3944 2170 3353 1798 
 
 Employ (5- GCSE) Employ (5+ GCSE) 
 Male Female Male Female 
 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 
Constant 0.029 
[0.051] 
-0.015 
[0.071] 
0.058 
[0.058] 
0.080 
[0.080] 
0.238*** 
[0.071] 
0.324*** 
[0.096] 
0.012 
[0.068] 
-0.009 
[0.093] 
Linear -0.014 
[0.110] 
-0.037 
[0.164] 
0.106 
[0.128] 
0.008 
[0.188] 
0.334** 
[0.151] 
0.186 
[0.210] 
0.059 
[0.146] 
0.317 
[0.213] 
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Quadratic -0.133 
[0.191] 
-0.009 
[0.318] 
0.015 
[0.221] 
0.578 
[0.367] 
0.188 
[0.250] 
0.193 
[0.403] 
0.338 
[0.252] 
-0.042 
[0.423] 
Observations  2497 1364 1868 993 1447 806 1485 805 
 
 Employ (D-G GCSE) Employ (A-C GCSE) 
 Male Female Male Female 
 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 
Constant -0.029 
[0.089] 
-0.180 
[0.122] 
0.082 
[0.110] 
0.149 
[0.154] 
0.144*** 
[0.047] 
0.187*** 
[0.064] 
0.047 
[0.048] 
0.028 
[0.065] 
Linear -0.272 
[0.188] 
-0.287 
[0.271] 
0.165 
[0.241] 
-0.151 
[0.361] 
0.238 
[0.101] 
0.184 
[0.147] 
0.080 
[0.104] 
0.173 
[0.150] 
Quadratic -0.407 
[0.320] 
0.051 
[0.526] 
-0.247 
[0.424] 
0.305 
[0.714] 
0.134 
[0.172] 
0.128 
[0.285] 
0.208 
[0.178] 
0.223 
[0.295] 
Observations  840 457 560 298 3104 1713 2093 1500 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in employment. The category of 5- GCSE includes individuals with less than 5 GCSE and 5+ GCSE includes 
individuals with five or more GCSE. A-C GCSE and D-G GCSE stand for individual’s highest qualification is A-C or D-G. The results are based on different polynomial 
terms and window length. Control variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%;  
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Table 4.8 Displacement effect 
 D-G GCSE A-C GCSE 5- GCSE 5+ GCSE 
VARIABLES d(-1) d(-1) d(-2) d(-2) 
     
discontituity -0.167 0.004 0.156 0.083 
 (0.147) (0.073) (0.158) (0.078) 
duration 0.009 0.009 -0.0215 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) 
Duration  
discontinuity 
0.008 -0.009 0.028 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012) 
Constant 1.965*** 1.607*** 1.682*** 1.539*** 
 (0.481) (0.225) (0.490) (0.229) 
     
Observations 1,400 5,897 1,400 5,897 
Notes: Probit model. The results are based on different polynomial terms and window length. Control variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month 
of birth, and years. The d(-1) and d(-2) denote the one month and two months before the age threshold. 
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Table 4.9 19-20 and 22-23 discontinuity 
 20 years old  23 years old 
Employ (A-C GCSE) Employ (D-G GCSE) Employ (A-C GCSE) Employ (D-G GCSE) 
22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 
Constant 0.025 
[0.032] 
-0.002 
[0.044] 
0.068* 
[0.037] 
0.040 
[0.050] 
0.049 
[0.035] 
0.071 
[0.048] 
0.045 
[0.069] 
0.013 
[0.094] 
Linear -0.050 
[0.070] 
-0.052 
[0.101] 
0.008 
[0.081] 
0.048 
[0.116] 
0.075 
[0.075] 
0.055 
[0.108] 
0.043 
[0.147] 
0.234 
[0.215] 
Quadratic -0.059 
[0.119] 
-0.035 
[0.196] 
0.070 
[0.138] 
0.132 
[0.225] 
0.087 
[0.127] 
0.052 
[0.206] 
0.262 
[0.252] 
0.181 
[0.409] 
         
Observations  6342 3401 4571 2502 5495 2980 1337 730 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether individual is in employment. The category of 5- GCSE includes individuals with less than 5 GCSE and 5+ GCSE includes 
individuals with five or more GCSE. A-C GCSE and D-G GCSE stand for individual’s highest qualification is A-C or D-G. The results are based on different polynomial 
terms and window length. Control variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%; 
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 Table 4.10 Working hours among male employed workers 
 Working hours 
Male  Female 
Employ (5+ GCSE) Employ (5- GCSE) Employ (5+ GCSE) Employ (5- GCSE) 
22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 22 months 12 months 
Constant 1.551** 
[0.575] 
 1.753** 
[0.803] 
0.096 
[0.608] 
0.483 
[0.781] 
0.832 
[0.762] 
-1.451 
[1.029] 
-0.676  
[0.817] 
-0.366 
[1.169] 
Linear 2.059* 
[1.127] 
-0.190 
[1.469] 
-0.754 
[1.272] 
-1.668 
[1.773] 
-2.660 
[1.672] 
0.576 
[2.441] 
0.043 
[1.992] 
0.848 
[2.901] 
Quadratic -1.084 
[1.656] 
0.494 
[2.787] 
-1.161 
[2.146] 
-1.510 
[3.396] 
0.129 
[2.918] 
-2.901 
[4.666] 
1.912 
[3.641] 
1.937 
[6.252] 
         
Observations  1027 573 1553 866 960 531 864 461 
Notes: The dependent variable is working hours in every period. Control variables are local unemployment, dummy for disable, month of birth, and years. * 
significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; 
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Chapter 5 
Quantitative effects of higher education expansion on the 
returns to education: Evidence from the UK 
 
5.1 Introduction and literature review. 
5.1.1 Introduction. 
After the ‘Education Reform Act 1988’, increasingly graduates left full-time 
education with a degree. The proportion of university graduates increased from 
15% for men and 13% for women to 30% and 35% respectively (Walker and Zhu, 
2008). Not only the number of graduates increased due to the reform but also the 
average level of education. However, the increased average education is not 
solely due to the reform. It was increasing rapidly in the recent decades. The 
people who hold the A-level qualification increased significantly and on the other 
hand the number of individuals who hold GCSEs as the highest qualification fell. 
Although due to the endeavour of the British government to vocational education 
such as National Vocational Qualification (NVQ), the numbers of vocational 
student increased slightly during that periods.  
The reform allowed universities to relax the recruiting requirements for the 
students. The newly recruited university graduates might be less capable 
compared to the previous graduates as a result of the relaxed requirements, 
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leading to ambiguous results if the compositional changes are not controlled. The 
literature minimizes ability bias by narrowing down the scope in which only 
includes individuals with at least one or two A-levels (Blundell et al, 2000; 
Walker and Zhu, 2008). Walker and Zhu (2008) examine how the education 
expansion affects university wage premium. Interestingly, they don't find strong 
negative effects on the returns of new graduates and even marginal positive 
effect for women. 75 76  Subsequently, Devereux and Fan (2011) argued that 
because of the increasing number of individuals with A-levels, the results may 
also be biased. They apply Two-Stage Lease Squared (TSLS) to examine the wage 
premium of a degree using Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and argue that 
the increasing education has a 6% wage premium for both men and women. 
However, there are returning students who pursue a degree as a result of the 
reform. In this study, the returning students represent the student who the age of 
obtaining highest qualification is larger than the age of leaving full-time 
education. Their TSLS results may also lead to a misunderstanding due to this 
heterogeneity. If the increasing numbers of returning student become university 
graduates due to the reform, their results would be biased due to this additional 
channel that they haven’t picked up. They did not check how relaxed entry 
requirements affected the opportunity of attending universities. Walker and Zhu 
(2011) argue that the returns vary a lot by subjects and the rise of tuition fees 
                                                        
75 They point out that the results might be biased by the personal innate ability. They 
also examine the heterogeneity based on a quantile regression. 
76 An important point for DID analysis is to select the comparable control group. The 
results may be completely different with different control groups.  
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had the relatively lower effects on the overall return for students in the UK. 
Lindley and Mcintosh (2015) firstly examined income inequality among 
graduates. They applied a variance analysis and argued that the widening 
variance of personal abilities is because of the differential accepting rules among 
universities. They argue that the large income inequalities among graduates 
mostly come from differences within a subject rather than between subjects. 
They also show the relation between the relaxed university entry requirements 
and the large wage variation. The literature implies there exists strong 
heterogeneities among the returns of university graduates. 
Due to the fact that the reform may lead to more students with distinctive 
educational background entering into universities, the results might be very 
heterogeneous. The relaxed requirements in universities may not only open 
doors for the fresh students but also individuals who have a similar level of 
education and several years of working experiences, namely the returning 
students. It is commonly believed that individuals with a lower level of education 
tend to have a lower innate ability. However, Birch and Miller (2007) find that 
students who like to defer universities are found with higher schooling marks 
compared to those who start university right away from high schools. Their 
results and the fact that abilities tend to be multiple dimensions may imply this 
question might be more complex than we expected. Due to the limit of the data, 
previous studies fail to examine this heterogeneity. I provide evidence of the 
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heterogeneity of the effect induced by the education expansion.  
The current literature argues that the education expansion doesn’t incur largely 
negative effects on the returns to the newly recruited graduates. Surprisingly the 
effects of the education reform on the returning students have not been 
examined. Individuals with working experiences tend to be older and more 
mature compared to other younger students. They may arrange their learning 
plan and also the career plan after study better. More importantly, they may 
choose the most suitable learning plan combining with their existing human 
capital and future career plan. On the other hand, they tend to have more years of 
working experiences, but they also tend to have fewer years of fundamental 
education.77 To my knowledge, there are very few papers which focus on the 
determinants of the decision of re-education, the effect of re-education or the 
effect of education expansion on returning students. Not only those A-levels 
graduates will comply with this reform, but also some returning students who 
are willing to obtain more education will also comply the education expansion. 
One of the critics of vocational education is its weak link to higher education. If 
those newly recruited returning graduates are successful after obtaining a degree 
compared to their previous colleagues, then the fact may shed light on how to 
conduct education reform in the future. This group of people could be very 
heterogeneous and therefore need a very informative dataset. But analysing the 
effect of obtaining more education on this group is of particular public policy 
                                                        
77 They tend to have few years full-time education. 
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interest.  
 
5.1.2 The contribution. 
This chapter mainly focuses on examining the quantitative effect of the 
increasing university graduates on returns. Moreover, I illustrate another implicit 
achievement of the education expansion. That is to provide opportunities not 
only for the fresh students but also for the returning students who may benefit 
more from becoming university graduates out of clear purposes. I contribute to 
the literature in two ways. 
First, the 2SLS and statistical results show that the returns are rather 
heterogeneous. The individual with a lower probability of attending a university 
may benefit more compared to the newly recruited graduates. However, they may 
come from specific reasons, namely the unobservable factors. From the results, it 
is clear that the return to university is negatively correlated with the propensity 
score of the attending universities. From Figure 5.7, the trends are very clear that 
individuals with lower probabilities of attending university have higher working 
experiences and lower education, holding lower numbers of A-levels and GCSE. 
To sum up, there are three types of new university graduates. They are returning 
students, A-level fresh students and higher level of fresh vocational education 
students respectively.78 Due to the heterogeneous background among the new 
                                                        
78 From the results, most newly recruited university graduates are with less than 24 
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university entrants and complex measurement errors such that individuals may 
report as a university student since they may attend a Polytechnic before the 
reform.79 The instruments to estimate the propensity scores are birth cohorts 
and the instruments are considered to be exogenous and meet the exclusion 
restriction (Devereux and Fan, 2011). Moreover, the subjects are included as 
control variables in the reduced form to control for the underlying heterogeneity. 
Due to the fact that different subjects have different requirements, it may lead to 
the bias into the results if it is not controlled for (Lindley and Mcintosh, 2015; 
Walker and Zhu, 2011).   
Second, I apply the simple Difference-in-Difference (DID) methodology to 
estimate the effect of an increase in the supply of university graduates on the 
returns directly and Matching Difference-in-Difference (MDID) to correct for the 
bias. The propensity score is the probability of attending university.80 I apply 
two different methods to perform the matching strategy. One is the popular 
propensity score matching. Another is called Coarsened Exact Matching which it 
has become popular in recent years in order to check the robustness. Compared 
to the previous studies, I don’t focus on individuals who have at least one A-level 
due to the fact that increasingly returning students born after 1976 obtain a 
degree. It will bring unnecessary bias into the results if we drop individuals who 
                                                                                                                                                              
continuous years of education, see Figure 5.1. 
79 Further and Higher Education Act 1992. 
80 The propensity score is estimated by “Probit” model, based on year of birth, numbers 
of A-level, numbers of GCSE, industry, sex, years of survey, quarter of survey education, 
squared of education, experiences, squared of experiences, tenure, marriage, job training, 
disable, and London dummy. 
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don’t have A-levels. The matching strategy will balance the characteristics 
between the treatment group and control group before and after the reform. It 
corrects the ability bias and estimates the quantitative effect of the increasing 
graduates on the returns. As I mentioned above, due to the limitations of the data, 
I can’t capture the change in the scores at A-level. Since the data doesn’t include 
information regarding the exact numbers of A-level and the grades of A-levels, 
the changes in the composition of A-levels are ambiguous to identify new 
graduates who enter into university without work experiences.  
In order to best account for the heterogeneous effect, I divided the sample into 
three different periods, before-expansion, during-expansion, and post-expansion 
based on their birth cohorts (Devereux and Fan, 2011). Individuals who are born 
between 1970 and 1975 belong to “pre-expansion”. Individuals who are born 
between 1970 and 1975 belong to “during-expansion” Individuals who are born 
after 1975 belong to “post-expansion”. After correcting the ability bias, the 
results show that there is a strong negative effect for the fresh graduates in the 
post-expansion period. There are around 46% university graduates who obtain a 
degree after finishing the continuous education. From the DID results, both fresh 
students and returning students don’t have significantly negative effects in both 
periods. The MDID results correct the innate ability bias and shows that there 
exists significant negative effect on returns for the fresh students. Here, the MDID 
results for the returning students may correct the changes in the characteristics 
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in which is captured by age, years of education and numbers of A-levels. The 
MDID results for the fresh students are different from the DID results in 
post-expansion period because there are increasing individuals who have more 
years of education.81  
 
5.1.3 Source of Variation of matching-DID. 
The problem with the current literature is that few literature shed light on how 
the characteristics changed among newly recruited university graduates. In 
another word, the bias comes from the change in the innate personal ability, 
leading to a non-identical treatment group as a result of the reform. The simple 
DID results combine qualitative effect with quantitative effect.  
The numbers of the A-level can’t fully capture the change in the admission rules 
for the A-level graduates. But the compositional change may capture the change 
in relative probabilities of attending universities for the returning students and 
higher levels of vocational education students. The decrease in numbers of 
A-levels may come from vocational students who have similar years of education 
with the fresh students. The compositional changes would be captured in the 
numbers of A-level, years of continuous education or years of working 
                                                        
81 From Figure 5.7, we can see that the years of education increase continuously along 
with the propensity score. Individuals with the highest propensity score might be 
students with higher years of education than A-level graduates, but obtain the degree 
due to the reform. 
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experience. Those variations may also be captured in MDID results. That may 
explain why there is a difference between DID and MDID results for fresh 
students. 
 
5.1.4 Potential biases and future work. 
The first one is the incapability of capturing the compositional change in terms of 
personal abilities, such as of score and number of A-levels. Due to the fact that 
the parental background has impacts on higher education attainment, parental 
background might be helpful to control the compositional change. By taking 
advantage of the Understanding Society, the results are very similar to the QLFS. 
Dearden (1999) argue that the OLS result can be 30% upward biased due to 
omitted variables of personal ability or background. For the returning students, 
the newly recruited university graduates might be different from those who don’t 
participate in universities. 
Second, universities could be very heterogeneous in terms of the types of 
qualification, the quality of the programs, the reputation of the institutions, and 
so on. It is expected that some returning students will take a part-time degree 
that can’t be captured in my data and also the quality of institutions (Walker and 
Zhu, 2011). The third is that there is a lack of information regarding the 
educational background of newly recruited graduates. In the current data, only 
 
127 
their continuous years of education, numbers of A-level and numbers of GCSE are 
available to me. But I don’t have the information in terms of their highest 
education before obtaining a degree. This could lead to ambiguous results.  
Regardless of the above potential biases, there are several interesting extensions 
can be done. The returning students are both politically and personally 
interesting to explore. In this study, I present the heterogeneous returns 
compared to the fresh students. However, due to the limit of data, I couldn’t 
examine the effects of characteristics of determining to pursue a degree, which 
presumptively it will lead a selection bias when examines the returns among 
returning students. It needs a very informative dataset which includes a 
comprehensive background. After exploring why they decide to pursue a degree 
and what is the outcome of that, more policies could be made in order to 
differentiate the market and to provide more efficient courses for the returning 
students.  
 
5.2 Data. 
5.2.1 Data description. 
The main data is drawn from the 2002 to 2013 Quarter Labour Force Survey. The 
birth cohorts are from 1965-1979 and age range of the sample is from 33 to 43 
years-old since observations are only matched in this age band, shown in Figure 
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5.1.82 This feature has an advantage that it can allow us to examine the full 
potential returns when they are in the middle of their career (Blundell et al, 
2000). Another part of the data is drawn from Understanding Society wave A to 
wave E. The age range is from 40 to 45 years-old and the birth cohorts are from 
1965-1975. The parental occupation is available in Understanding Society. It 
could be used to capture the background of the newly recruited university 
graduates. 
<Figure 5.1 Here> 
The numbers of individuals who hold A-levels are shown in Figure 5.2. The 
categorical variable in QLFS indicates if an individual holds one, more than two 
or none A-levels.83 So here the y-axis shows the ambiguous numbers of A-level 
which individual holds given different birth cohorts. It clearly shows that the 
total number of individuals holding A-level has largely increased after 1970 birth 
cohort. It suggests that the higher education expansion has pushed the students 
to get more A-levels or the grade inflation.  
<Figure 5.2 Here> 
Figure 5.3 shows that the number of A-levels among graduates given birth 
cohorts. It shows that the proportion of A-levels among the graduates gradually 
decreased over time, indicating that there is a compositional change among the 
                                                        
82 This study particularly focuses on the effects in England and Wales. 
83 “NUMAL” in QLFS refers to how many A-levels does an individual holds. 
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university graduates.  
<Figure 5.3 Here> 
The personal innate ability might be a serious bias on the basis of the simple DID. 
Previous literature neglects the compositional change among university 
graduates. It turns out to be a very important change along with the higher 
education expansion.84 More returning students become university graduates, 
especially born after 1975. In the QLFS sample, the proportion of the returning 
student among university graduates is higher than the fresh students after 1978. 
That may potentially explain why there are robust heterogeneous returns among 
the graduates and why the returns in 1976-1979 are significantly lower 
compared to the period between 1970 and 1975. Figure 5.4 has shown this trend. 
After 1970, the numbers of university graduate of fresh students increased. 
However, the returning students tend to be constant during that period and it 
increased significantly after 1975.  
<Figure 5.4 Here> 
Figure 5.5 shows the individual’s age when they completed the full-time 
education. There are around 41% university graduates who belong to the 
returning students. Among them, there are sufficient amount of the returning 
students with at least 20 years of continuous education before becoming 
                                                        
84 Back to 1970s, students who go to the universities may have more homogeneous 
background because of the O-level and fewer universities. 
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university graduates. Most of the returning students have around 16 years, 18 
years, and 21 years full-time education. Those may refer to A-level, GCSEs level, 
and HNC/HND level respectively.  
<Figure 5.5 Here> 
 
5.2.2 Measurement error. 
First, it is a self-reported data. People may report their “university” status given 
the current classification, but their self-reported full-time years of education fail 
to include the years spending in the university. Second, it is a part-time degree. It 
takes more time compared to a full-time degree in which can’t be controlled in 
this study. Moreover, I differentiate the returning students and the fresh students 
based on their self-reported continuous years of education and age when 
completed the qualification. The measurement error is inevitable. The 
robustness checks are necessary. 
 
5.3 Matching Difference-in-Difference. 
Due to the fact that universities have relaxed the entry requirements, the 
university graduates matriculated before 1988 may have different personal 
innate ability compared to the graduates matriculated after 1988. The simple 
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DID may be biased if those compositional change may enter the group-specific 
effects and those effects fail to control for. MDID is a promising method to tackle 
with this problem, although it also depends on the data which it includes 
variables describing the compositional change before they take the treatment 
(degree), such as scores or numbers of A-level. In my dataset, it only includes the 
number of A-levels, so intuitively it can only capture the compositional change 
among the returning students since they tend to hold fewer numbers of A-levels 
or even none. This method was originally developed by Heckman et al (1997, 
1998).  
There are mainly three types of biases. One is the selection on the un-observables. 
Another one is the failure of a common support condition and the last one is a 
failure to weight treatment and comparison group comparably for which they 
argue that it is unlikely happened in matching strategy (Heckman et al 1997). 
The first and the second bias will be corrected by the matching method. However, 
the common support may bring additional bias if treatment effect is 
heterogeneous among the treated group (Blundell et al, 2005).  
D is the treatment. The university graduates are treated individuals, denoted as 
𝐷𝑖 = 1. Others remain in the control group, denoted as 𝐷𝑖 = 0. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
outcome of individual i in time t, before the reform. 𝑌𝑖𝑡′  denotes the outcome of 
individual i in time 𝑡′, after the reform. 𝑋1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈1 are the observables and 
un-observables for the treated group. 𝑋0𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈0  are the observables and 
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un-observables for the control group. ATE is the average treatment effect. 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋1, 𝑈1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋0, 𝑈0)     (1) 
𝐵 = 𝐸(𝑈1) − 𝐸(𝑈0) 
And the bias will become zero when treatment assignment is independent 
conditional on X.  
𝑌1, 𝑌0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑋 
That means 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋1, 𝐷 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋0, 𝐷 = 1) 
Given the assumption of “Strong Ignorability” proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Robin (1985), 0<P(D=1|X)<1. Together with the former two equations, that 
implies the following, 
(𝑌0, 𝑌1) ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑃(𝑋) 
𝐸(𝑌1|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐷 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐷 = 1)              (2) 
Essentially X can be decomposed into (T, Z). T is variables retained in the reduced 
form and Z is the exogenous variables in the first stage.  
𝑌1 = 𝑓1(𝑇) + 𝑈1, 𝑌0 = 𝑓0(𝑇) + 𝑈0 
Due to the fact that Z is completely exogenous, it leads to 𝑈0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑍. With same 
spirit with “Strong Ignorability”, it leads to 𝑌1, 𝑌0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑃(𝑍). Then, 
𝐸(𝑈0|𝑃(𝑍), 𝐷 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑈0|𝑃(𝑍), 𝐷 = 1)     (3) 
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Matching is still a “selection-on-observables” method, under the language of 
Heckman and Robb (1985). Common support problem can be eliminated if 
matching is performed over common support. The Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) doesn’t hold when the unobservables affect the outcome even 
under the control of propensity score. MDID relaxes the CIA from single 
observation to pair-wise. In this setting, we only need the CIA holds in the first 
difference equation.  
𝐸(𝑌0𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑡′|𝑋0, 𝐷 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌0𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑡′|𝑋0, 𝐷 = 1)   (4) 
Under index sufficiency the equation becomes 
𝐸(𝑌0𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑡′|𝑃(𝑍), 𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑡′|𝑃(𝑍), 𝐷 = 1)   (5) 
The results normally vary with different matching scheme. Different weights 
have been proposed.  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 1
𝑁
∑ [𝑄1𝑖 − ∑ 𝑊𝑁0,𝑁1(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑄0𝑗𝑗∈𝐼0 ]𝑖∈𝐼1     (6) 
In nearest neighbors matching, 𝑄1𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖, 𝑄0𝑗 = 𝑌0𝑗, defined a matched sample as 
𝐶(𝑋𝑖) =∥ 𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑗 ∥< 𝜀 ,  𝑊𝑁0,𝑁1(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1  for matched observations, others are 
zero. 
In kernel matching, the weights are 𝑊𝑁0,𝑁1(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐺𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝐼0
. 
A regression adjusted matching has been complemented into DID by Heckman et 
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al (1997). In this setting, 𝑄1𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑖𝑡′ , 𝑄0𝑗 = 𝑌0𝑗 − 𝑌0𝑗𝑡′  
𝑊𝑁0,𝑁1(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐺𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝐼0
 
A conditional DID matching estimator is been proposed as well,  
𝑄1𝑖 = [(𝑌1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽0𝑡) − (𝑌𝑜𝑖𝑡′ − 𝑋𝑖𝑡′𝛽0𝑡)]=[( 𝑌1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑖𝑡′)-( 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ − 𝑋𝑖𝑡) 𝛽0𝑡] 
𝑄1𝑗 = [(𝑌1𝑗𝑡 − 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽0𝑡) − (𝑌𝑜𝑗𝑡′ − 𝑋𝑗𝑡′𝛽0𝑡)]=[( 𝑌1𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑗𝑡′)-( 𝑋𝑗𝑡′ − 𝑋𝑗𝑡) 𝛽0𝑡] 
The setting is perfectly suitable for solving the problem of changes in 
characteristics of treatment group before and after time t. Chen and Jin (2012) 
suggest that the heterogeneity within a group allow us to control for the 
unobservable attributes based on an assumption that individual’s unobservable 
attributes have the same distribution with observable attributes.85 Halla and 
Zweimueller (2013) suggest combining DID and matching may effectively 
eliminated biases caused by unobservable attributes in the presence of 
longitudinal data.  
 
5.4 Results. 
5.4.1 Heterogeneity among university graduates. 
                                                        
85  Unlike Heckman et al (1997) and Heckman et al (1998) in which they use 
longitudinal data, here they use all households within each county with unequal 
probabilities to participate the program to account for the unobservable heterogeneity 
attributes.  
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Figure 5.6 shows the changes in the returns between university graduates and 
non-university graduates given the propensity scores of attending universities. 
From Figure 5.6, it is clear shows that individual’s return is negatively correlated 
with propensity scores. Obviously the highly significant differences are due to the 
fact that the university graduates and the non-university graduates are rather 
different based on the propensity scores.86  
<Figure 5.6 Here> 
In order to capture the intuition of the heterogeneity, I show that the individual’s 
characteristics on the basis of the propensity score of attending universities. 
Figure 5.7 shows that individuals with the lowest level of attending university 
have substantially lower numbers of A-levels, number of GCSEs and year of 
education. Returning students have a lower university attendance rate, along 
with more working experiences and fewer years of education. 
<Figure 5.7 Here> 
Table 5.1 shows a simple breakdown of the types of student. For the university 
graduates, the average education of the returning students’ increases compared 
to the fresh students. Presumably, the new returning students would come from 
GCSE, A-level graduates, and HNC or equivalent qualifications. But the mean 
                                                        
86 The lowest propensity scores may consist of individuals who have lower levels of 
education. The middle part of the figure consists of A-level graduates. The right part 
with the highest propensity scores may come from individual with postgraduates and 
higher levels of vocational education, such as NVQ, HND etc. That implies there should be 
many channels which need to be controlled. 
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numbers of A-level for the returning students who have a degree doesn’t change. 
It suggests that those new returning university graduates may come from 
individuals whose have a higher full-time vocational education. Moreover, the 
average education doesn’t change among the returning students who don’t have 
a degree. The results suggest that there are more students who have more years 
of education went to universities as a result of the reform. Not only the average 
years of education, but also the number of universities graduate increase for both 
types of the students.87  
<Table 5.1 Here> 
<Figure 5.8 Here> 
Table 5.2 shows the 2SLS results for the fresh students and the returning 
students separately on the basis of the periods of attending universities. The 
results suggest that the returning students may benefit around 20% after 
becoming university graduates compared to the fresh students. The results are 
similar to Devereux and Fan (2011) in which they run the sufficient robustness 
checks. My results are quite similar to theirs, only differentiated by returning 
students and fresh students. The results suggest that the returning students and 
the fresh students have different returns after obtaining a degree and the 
returning students tend to have higher returns than the fresh students among 
                                                        
87 Figure 5.8 also shows that the proportional change for returning students who obtain 
a degree as a result of the reform. It shows the distribution of continuous years of 
education of returning students who went to universities. 
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males. The returning students may have clear purposes of attending the 
university and stronger personal abilities as result of years of working 
experience. 
<Table 5.2 Here> 
 
5.4.2 DID and MDID. 
To testify the source of bias, I split the sample into two groups, fresh students 
and returning students. Those individuals could be very diverse. Unlike the fresh 
students who go to university when they finish A-levels or higher levels of 
vocational education, returning students may have a more diverse educational 
background and working experiences. The QLFS dataset is not very informative 
regarding this perspective. It only includes the number of A-levels without the 
grades of those A-levels which does not allow me to capture the compositional 
change as a result of the reform for fresh university graduates. But it can capture 
those individuals who go to university with a lower number of A-levels or even 
without A-levels. In the Understanding Society, parental occupations are used to 
capture the compositional change.  
Table 5.3 presents the DID and MDID results for the fresh students and the 
returning students respectively on the basis of different education expansion 
periods. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
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are used to balance the compositional changes. The DID results don’t show 
significantly negative effects on the returns to the university graduates in both 
periods. For the MDID results, the most robust negative effects concentrate on 
the fresh students in the post-expansion period. The results are consistent in 
general between QLFS and Understanding Society. The negative effects only 
appearing in the post-expansion period may suggest that the quantitative effect 
is increasing with the increasing numbers of university graduates. That fact 
implies that we can improve the average years of education among the 
population with very little cost if we can subtly control the increase in the 
numbers of university graduates. The results also suggest that oversupply 
graduates don’t decrease the returns of returning students, showing that the 
returning students have more stable returns. That may be because the returning 
students tend to have clear purposes before deciding to pursue a degree. In order 
to add the covariates to control for, I perform the DID strategy with weights, 
generated by the DID-PSM strategy. The results are shown in the brackets. After 
including more control variables in PSM, all results attenuate. The results 
between PSM and SEM show a very similar pattern and magnitude. With more 
covariates included in the regression such as subjects, the heterogeneities among 
the graduates could be better controlled. 
<Table 5.3 Here> 
Figure 5.9 shows the balance in father occupation in Understanding Society. This 
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figure is used to testify this condition 𝐸(𝑌0𝑡 − 𝑌𝑜𝑡′|𝑃(𝑍), 𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑡 −
𝑌𝑜𝑡′|𝑃(𝑍), 𝐷 = 1). Visually, CEM does a better job compared to PSM. Each bar 
presents the difference in the proportion of the university graduates and the 
non-university graduates under the father’s occupations before and after the 
reform. Blue bars represent proportional changes in the proportion of university 
graduates given the father’s occupations. Orange bars represent the proportional 
changes after weighted by SEM. Gray bars represent the proportional changes 
after weighted by PSM. Figure 5.10 shows the balance in number of A-levels. 
Figure 5.11 shows the balance in education for returning students. Clearly, CEM 
does a better work in the sense of balancing.  
<Figure 5.9-5.11 Here> 
 
5.4.3 Sensitivity test. 
In order to show the robustness of the results, I perform the sensitivity test on 
the basis of the relative new technique. Oster (2016) proposed a new sensitivity 
test in which she argues that R-squared should take into consideration since the 
coefficients would not change massively when an uninformative control is 
included, as well as the R-squared. She proposed a method to derive a range from 
a controlled treatment effect to an unbiased treatment effect and take the 
R-squared into consideration compared to the Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005). 
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Table 5.4 shows the sensitivity of the CEM-DID results using the QLFS. In Table 
5.4, the matching variables are different in the columns. The variables are all 
pre-treatment variables which are the variables of individuals before they went 
to university. I perform Oster’s (2016) sensitivity test for the significant results in 
Table 5.3 in order to show the robustness of the results. The maximum of 
R-squareds are assumed to be 1, twice the R-squared_tilda and 1.25 times the 
R-squared_tilda. The R-squared_tilda is the R-squared of a fully controlled 
regression. In each weighted regression, the control variables are the same. Only 
the weighting variables are different. I check the sensitivity of the results only in 
post-expansion period since the results are seemingly more significant in Table 
5.3. The QLFS-CEM-DID results show the strong robustness of the results. The 
ranges of the true treatment effect almost all lay within two standard deviations 
no matter how large the R-squared was.  
Table 5.5 shows the sensitivity test of the CEM-DID results in Understanding 
Society. The results don’t have any significant results on the basis of multiple sets 
of matching variables and R-squared. Although I notice that there is a significant 
positive effect in the third column, but the range of the treatment effect vary 
massively even when the maximum R-squared is very close to the 
R-squared_tilda. 
<Table 5.4 and 5.5> 
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5.5 Conclusions. 
Although the effect of the higher education expansion on returns has been largely 
examined, the results are still ambiguous to some extent due to measurement 
error and compositional changes. In this study, I apply MDID to examine the 
heterogeneous returns to the university graduates and highlight the differences 
in the return between the fresh students and the returning students.  
There are amount of returning students who obtain a degree as a result of the 
education expansion and the returns differ from the fresh students. The DID 
results are consistent with previous studies in that there are no significantly 
negative effects to the newly recruited university graduates. However, the MDID 
results correct the compositional change due to the fact that new graduates may 
have different educational backgrounds. The results suggest that there exists a 
significantly negative effect for the fresh students for both PSM-DID and SEM-DID 
results. The negative effects are more robust in the post-expansion periods. The 
negative effects concentrate on the fresh students. This might be due to the fact 
that there are more students with worse backgrounds becoming university 
graduates in the post-expansion period. The sensitivity tests show the negative 
effects for those fresh students are rather robust even the R-squared increases to 
one.  
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Given the results, there are enough reasons to believe that it may be not the best 
idea to push more students into universities. Individuals who have “worse” 
educational backgrounds and are not prepared to become university graduates 
need time and experiences to think the reasons before going into a university. 
Additionally, university level of education might be a potentially efficient path for 
some low-achievers to obtain more education and enhance their skills to make 
them more productive given the fact that they don’t have the university 
education due to multiple reasons.  
This chapter has several limitations as a result of the data. Although the 
returning students may benefit more after attending the universities, the 
definition of the returning students is ambiguous due to its nature, such as the 
reasons of being a returning student, years of working experiences, 
measurement errors and so on. A data with richer information regarding the 
employment history could be very helpful to understand the mechanisms by 
looking inside subgroups of the returning students. Moreover, there is lack of 
information regarding the academic backgrounds of A-level graduates. The 
information regarding the background may bring great benefit to improve the 
matching results.  
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Figures and Tables: 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Proportion of age band before and after the reform 
 
Notes: Proportion of observations born in different years, divided by born before and 
after 1970. 
Sources: QLFS 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Number of A-levels given birth cohorts 
 
Notes: Mean of average numbers of A-level. 
Sources: QLFS 
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Figure 5.3 Number of A-levels among graduates given birth cohorts 
 
Notes: Mean of average numbers of A-level among graduates. 
Sources: QLFS 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Composition of degree given birth cohorts 
 
Notes: Y-axis represents the proportion of graduates among all qualifications on the 
basis of birth cohorts. The sample includes all observations. 
Sources: QLFS 
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Figure 5.5 Ages when completed full-time education of returning students among 
university graduates. 
 
Notes: Fraction of age when leaving continuous education among returning university 
graduates. 
Sources: QLFS 
 
Figure 5.6 Wage difference between university graduates and non-university 
graduates 
 
Notes: Sample periods includes birth cohort from 1965 to 1979. The wage differences 
are calculated by subtracting the real log of wage between university graduates and 
non-university graduates on the basis of propensity scores.  
Sources: QLFS 
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Figure 5.7 Characteristics given propensity score of degree 
 
Notes: X-axis is propensity score of attending university. Here the propensity scores have 
been cut into bands. If squared of years of education is included, then the rate of degree 
would be linear given the propensity score. 
Sources: QLFS 
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Figure 5.8 Proportional change for returning students obtaining degree before 
and after the reform 
 
Notes: Relative proportional changes before and after the education expansion for 
returning students on the basis of years of full-time education. Y-axis is number of the 
proportional change compared to before the reform. 
Sources: QLFS 
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Figure 5.9 Balance of father occupation 
 
Notes: ∆Y1 represents the differences in the numbers of the university graduates before 
and after the reform given father’s occupation. ∆Y0 represents the non-university 
graduates. The blue bars identify the relatively proportional change between university 
graduates and non-university graduates. The orange bars represent the situation after 
re-weighted by SEM. The grey bars are after PSM weighted. Visually the SEM works 
better than PSM.  
Sources: Understanding Society 
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Figure 5.10 Balance in Number of A-levels (QLFS) 
 
Notes: This figure is similar to the previous figure. It describes the balance in number of 
A-levels.  “1”, ”2”, and ”3” represent none, one, and two and above two A-levels 
respectively.  
Sources: QLFS 
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Figure 5.11 Balance in education for returning students 
 
Notes: Above figure describes the balance in the years of education for returning 
students since there are rather different results between SEM weighted and PSM 
weighted. Visually, the PSM has failure in capturing the relatively proportional change in 
the years of education caused by the education reform compared to the SEM.  
Sources: QLFS 
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Table 5.1 Statistic summary 
Undergraduate Before reform (Born<1970) After reform (Born>=1970) 
 Fresh students Returning 
students 
Fresh students Returning 
students 
Sample size 2386 1626 4428  3306 
Education 22.02 18.49 22.14 20.16 
Experience 20.36 21.53 16.40 18.72 
No. A-level 1.54 0.898 1.46 0.895 
No. GCSE 0.898 0.844 0.881 0.728 
 
Non-Undergraduate     
Sample size 15974 12620 15126 15875 
Education 17.68 17.34 18.55 17.70 
Experience 20.94 21.67 17.19 19.13 
No. A-level 0.370 0.376 0.476 0.386 
No. GCSE 0.715 0.619 0.731 0.638 
Notes: The above panel summarizes individual’s characteristics among university 
graduates and below panel summarizes individual’s characteristics among 
non-university graduates. “No. A-level” and ”No. GCSE” are categorical variables which 
indicate rough numbers of A-level or GCSE.  
Sources: QLFS 
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Table 5.2 2SLS results 
 Fresh students Returning 
students 
2SLS   
1965-1975   
➔ Male 0.051*** 0.060*** 
➔ Female 0.063*** 0.059*** 
1965-1969 and 1976-1979   
➔ Male 0.056*** 0.062*** 
➔ Female 0.066*** 0.061*** 
Notes: The 2SLS results are similar results with Devereux and Fan (2011). I only 
separately run the regression based on sample periods and types of students. 
Sources: QLFS 
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Table 5.3 DID and MDID between individuals with or without working 
experiences for undergraduates 
 QLFS Understanding Society 
 Fresh students Returning students Fresh students Returning students 
DID 
Pre-expansion -0.013 -0.020 -0.081 0.000 
Post-expansion -0.056* -0.008   
  
MDID (PSM)   
Pre-expansion -0.058*** 
(-0.030*) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.126*** 
(-0.086**) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
Post-expansion -0.129*** 
(0.083***) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
  
  
MDID (CEM) 
Pre-expansion -0.028 -0.011 -0.098 0.003 
Post-expansion -0.065*** -0.038   
Notes: Given the result of female without working experiences, there might be other 
factors for which those could bias the results. The results only include males. In QLFS, 
the control variables are numbers of A-level, numbers of GCSE, experiences, squared of 
experiences, years of tenure, have job training, disability, marriage, work in London, 
full-time job, quarter, year, industry and subject in university. In Understanding Society, 
the control variables are age, years of education, marriage, father occupation, year and 
industry. 
Sources: QLFS and Understanding Society 
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Table 5.4 Sensitivity test for QLFS 
Estimates (1) (2) (3) 
Birth cohorts + + + 
A-levels  + + 
GCSEs   + 
CEM    
Post-expansion (Fresh) -0.073** -0.065** -0.065*** 
R squared 0.344 0.306 0.289 
N 9361 10008 9249 
PSACALC (Rmax=1) [-0.115, -0.073] [-0.092, -0.063] [-0.065, 0.070] 
PSACALC (Rmax=2*R squared) [-0.091, -0.073] [-0.075, -0.063] [-0.065, -0.018] 
PSACALC (Rmax=1.25*R 
squared) 
[-0.077, -0.073] [-0.067, -0.063] [-0.065, -0.054] 
Post-expansion (Mature) -0.031 -0.038 -0.021 
R squared 0.336 0.344 0.28 
N 8677 8030 7998 
PSACALC (Rmax=1) [-0.031, 0.035] [-0.037, 0.129] [-0.022, 0.157] 
PSACALC (Rmax=2*R squared) [-0.031, 0.139] [-0.037, 0.039] [-0.022, 0.043] 
PSACALC (Rmax=1.25*R 
squared) 
[-0.031, 0.007] [-0.037, -0.020] [-0.022, -0.006] 
Notes: Solely for the male. There is a trade-off between bias and efficiency for CEM since 
the strata could be enormous with increasing variables. PSM may not encounter this 
problem. For CEM, the weights are estimated with different covariates. Birth cohorts, 
A-levels, GCSEs, education, marriage, and disable are pre-treatment variables. “Rmax” in 
the PSACALC test is 1 which is the R squared.  
Sources: QLFS 
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Table 5.5 Sensitivity test for Understanding Society 
Estimates (1) (2) (3) 
Birth cohorts + + + 
Father occupation  + + 
Mother occupation   + 
CEM    
Pre-expansion (Fresh) -0.087 -0.098 -0.061 
R squared 0.306 0.309 0.307 
N 4729 4397 3222 
PSACALC (Rmax=1) [-0.087, 5.76] [-0.097, 5.68] [-26.6, -0.061] 
PSACALC (Rmax=2*R squared) [-0.087, 3.79] [-0.097, 3.76] [-26.0, -0.061] 
PSACALC (Rmax=1.25*R squared) [-0.087, 1.85] [-0.097, 1.83] [-25.6, -0.061] 
Pre-expansion (Mature) 0.002 0.003 0.078** 
R squared 0.250 0.226 0.230 
N 7344 7587 6305 
PSACALC (Rmax=1) [-2.78, 0.002] [0.003, 2.84] [0.078, 1.88] 
PSACALC (Rmax=2*R squared) [-1.60, 0.002] [0.003, 1.53] [0.078, 0.494] 
PSACALC (Rmax=1.25*R squared) [-0.80, 0.002] [0.003, 0.766] [0.078, 0.171] 
Notes: All results are based on the observations after dropping the missing observations 
of father’s occupation. The sample decreases around 30% after dropping the missing 
mother’s occupation observations. Including the missing observations doesn’t make 
significant change to the results only making the variance larger. I suspect that there is 
serious multicollinearity among parental information.  
Sources: Understanding Society 
 
 
 
 
  
 
157 
Chapter 6 
General Conclusions 
 
6.1 Findings. 
This thesis aims to address the economic outcomes of education regarding some 
crucial individuals’ education decisions. In the first empirical chapter, I focus on 
the returns to vocational education. The return to vocational education exists 
over time compared to academic education over time. The returns also vary by 
the types of vocational education. Although the returns to vocation education 
might be biased due to the age effect, it describes the relatively differences in 
returns between types of education over birth cohorts. Vocational education 
tends to have less promising career development in the future and the returns to 
vocational education become smaller in recent years. Moreover, the education 
expansion has negative effects on the returns to vocational education. The 
negative effects are smaller in the during-expansion periods when there are 
fewer graduates compared to post-expansion periods, suggesting that the 
quantitative effect of increasing graduates reduce the returns to vocational 
education. 
In general, the results suggest that vocational education leads to lower earning 
compared to academic education in the middle of career. The differences come 
from different educational background, personal abilities. The DID results 
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suggest that the returns to vocational education are still affected by the 
over-supply of academic students with similar levels of education. This chapter 
complements the literature in terms of the effects of education expansion on 
vocational education. It implies that the overall effect of increasing university 
graduates on the society might be underestimated if it only counts the negative 
effects on university graduates. 
In the second chapter, I examine the effect of becoming eligible for adult 
minimum wage rate on employment probability for different groups. There is a 
strong evidence of heterogeneous effects by qualifications. The results suggest 
that individuals with higher numbers or grades of GCSE have a higher probability 
of being employed after increasing the minimum wage. Besides the general 
employment opportunity, the results strongly suggest that higher skilled workers 
tend to find a more full-time permanent or full-time job after becoming eligible 
for higher minimum wage rate. But on the other hand, lower skilled workers 
have a lower probability of finding a full-time permanent job. The evidence of 
higher employment probability and higher satisfying job accession probability 
may imply that there is a crowding out effect coming from higher skilled workers. 
Although the result is modestly significant, the higher number of GCSEs and the 
higher proportion of 5+ GCSE suggest the existence of crowding out effect 
directly. On the other hand, there is no evidence in terms of lower skilled workers 
being made redundant. However, the limited information of the dataset does not 
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allow me to examine the replacement effect in more details or labour flows in 
general. With data in a booming period, one might expect more variation 
between the local unemployment rate and the employment probability. 
The implication of this chapter is that we should not neglect the possible adverse 
effects of the increase in minimum wage, especially in a recessionary period. Due 
to a tighter labour market, the discontinuity caused by increasing minimum wage 
will not only increase labour supply but also result in less chance for 
disadvantaged workers in labour market. Moreover, even though the negative 
effect of minimum wage is limited on average, the negative effect in subgroups 
may be still non-negligible. The results imply that exogenous increase in 
competition may have both immediate and long-term negative effects on 
disadvantaged workers. The minimum wage policy should be more flexible in a 
tighter labour market. The RD design could be more flexible and convincing if 
day of birth is available to construct the distances. Moreover, the stock of 
employment could be ambiguous. It might be clearer to examine crowding out 
effect on the basis of examining flow of labour, but that requires a more 
comprehensive dataset.  
In the third chapter, I apply MDID to examine the heterogeneous returns to the 
university graduates and highlight the differences in returns between the fresh 
students and the returning students. The DID results are consistent with the 
previous studies that there are no significantly negative effects to the newly 
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recruited university graduates. However, the MDID results correct the bias due to 
the fact that new graduates may have lower innate ability. It shows significantly 
negative effects for the fresh students. The results are consistent on the basis of 
the different matching strategies. Both matching strategies examine a strong 
negative effect for the fresh students in the post-expansion period. That might be 
due to the fact that there are more students with worse backgrounds becoming 
university graduates in the post-expansion period.  
Given the results, there are enough reasons to believe that it may be not the best 
idea to push more fresh graduates into universities. Getting them into 
employment is hard and pushing them into education is easy, but individuals 
who have “worse” background and are not prepared to become university 
graduates need time and experiences to think the reason for going into a 
university. 
 
6.2 Further work. 
The returns to education has been both extensively and intensively examined.88 
The selection between vocational and academic education has been a stubborn 
                                                        
88  Vocational education is more versatile than academic education. It serves 
multiple purposes in the society. The purposes regarding vocational education are also 
various in different countries. Due to its nature vocational education tends to be lack of 
general training in terms of cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills. Countries like U.S. 
do not emphasize the importance of vocational education in the level of secondary 
education. On the other hand, countries like Germany have long tradition regarding 
vocational education in the labour market. 
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problem in the literature. Most studies prefer to rely on a rich dataset which 
includes a comprehensive description regarding the early academic 
achievements and family backgrounds. However, due to the complex 
self-selection and the nature of multi-dimensional personal abilities the results 
might be still ambiguous. A more promising method is to take advantage of the 
quasi-experiment which converts vocational education into academic education 
or verse visa. Moreover, the disparities between academic and vocational tracks 
for the students might be existing since the beginning. The effects of early 
educational attainment on the selection of vocational education may be worth 
exploring. Intergenerational mobility has been both intensively and extensively 
examined. The evidence has shown that parents have influence on children’s 
education attainment, future income, mental health and so on. A consensus about 
interventions to children’s education is that early intervention is both effective 
and efficient. However, it is unrealistic to change the parental status. Primary 
education is children’s first formal and regulated education in their life. 
Practically, primary education can be considered as a promising intervene for the 
government to implement. Besides, little is known regarding the relation 
between early educational achievement and future educational achievement. The 
major difficulty is that there might be too many channels to pin down. The 
results would be ambiguous if only depending on the control methods.  
In the two empirical chapters, the return to education normally leaves a much 
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unexplained part in the standard Mincer’s equation, even on the basis of rich 
datasets regarding an individual’s background.89 And in the recent decades, 
there is a growing income inequality in the U.S. and UK. The analysis of income 
inequality across age, education, and occupation have been carried out 
intensively. The contribution of within-group inequality to the overall income 
inequality has been neglected (Barth et al, 2016). This motivates me that the 
firm’s characteristics may explain the within-education cell inequality. There are 
comprehensive evidence argues that firm-size has significant impacts on the 
wages differentials (Troske, 1999; Balkan and Tumen, 2016, etc). Lindley and 
McIntosh (2015) examine the income inequality among university graduates 
given variance analysis. The similar extension of the variance analysis could be 
performed on the basis of firm-level or industry-level, as well as the variance 
decomposition proposed by Lemieux (2006). Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a 
comprehensive dataset which describes the labour market and it covers most of 
the countries in the Europe. British Cohort Study (BCS) and National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) might be also helpful as it includes rich information 
regarding the early educational attainments. However, an employer-employee 
data would be helpful to pin down the channels of heterogeneous firm impacts in 
this study, such as Income Data Services (IDS) in the UK. The contribution of this 
                                                        
89 Although the employment process involves randomness, some of the potential 
factors that we may neglect are the factors of the workplaces. Two identical workers 
may have different returns in because of the firm’s characteristics, such as physical 
capital intensity (skill and capital complementary), market power (higher profitability), 
monitoring, unionization, workers clusters (highly productive workers in a team). 
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study would be twofold. First, by discovering the firm characteristics on the 
income inequality, we may have a better understanding why the standard Mincer 
wage equation leaves the unexplained error term. Second, with rich 
industry-level data we may acknowledge how firm characteristic affects income 
inequality.  
There is a widely accepted argument that minimum wage has influential impacts 
on the level of employment. However, the change in the level of employment may 
have multiple reasons, such as job accession rate, job separation rate, turnover 
rate, and so on. Recent literature regarding minimum wage focuses on the flow of 
labour. There is few study examining the flow of labour in the Europe, due to the 
limit of the data. The existing literature regarding the flow of labour is based on 
the establishment-level dataset. Moreover, the minimum wage of apprenticeship 
was introduced in 2010. It may encourage young workers to convert the career 
path. After realizing the effects of increasing the minimum wage on the level of 
employment and the flow of labour for the younger workers, it is interesting to 
know how to escape from the lower return jobs. Many literature has suggested 
that there exists strong low-pay-no-pay cycle among lower level jobs. After 
getting older and having more working experiences, the younger workers may 
want to find better paid jobs. Although the literature suggests the state 
dependence, the mechanisms have not been discovered. Do the signals sending 
from a low-paid job make them less likely end in a better paid job? Or the 
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previous jobs simply don’t accumulate the useful human capital for the future 
career? Finding the reason behind the state dependence becomes very important 
for the individuals and policy makers to regulate the education policies. 
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